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Governments
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maintain it, and a remedy if he is injured in the exercise or enjoyment of it; and
indeed it is a vain thing to imagine a right without a remedy; for want of right
and want of remedy are reciprocal.'
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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine an individual whose friend has allowed him to stay in
a bedroom of his trailer home. This individual brings his most treas-
ured and personal possessions along with him. Two police officers,
after receiving information of potential criminal activity from an
informant, enter the trailer without a warrant. Instead of obtaining a
warrant, the officers solicit the consent of a third party and ransack
the bedroom-leaving it in complete disarray. They find no evidence
of the alleged criminal wrongdoing and seize no property. Although
the police do not arrest the individual, they have humiliated him and
have invaded his privacy. These state agents acted without a war-
rant, without the individual's consent, and in the absence of
recognized exigent circumstances.
The United States Supreme Court has held that this particular
type of police conduct does not violate the Fourth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution;2 thus, no Section 1983 claim may be brought
against these state officers. 3 Certain state supreme courts, however,
have reached a different conclusion, finding similar conduct to violate
comparable provisions of their respective state constitutions.4 These
2. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188 (1990) (holding that a warrantless search
conducted pursuant to the consent of a third party does not violate the Fourth Amendment so
long as the officer reasonably believed that the third party had authority to grant consent to a
search of the premises). See also U.S. Const., Amend. IV (protecting against unlawful searches
and seizures).
3. Section 1983 allows for damage suits against a "person" acting under the color of state
law for a violation of the plaintiffs civil rights conferred under federal law or the U.S.
Constitution. It provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for re-
dress....
Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1997). Thus, when no violation of federal law has occurred, no
cause of action exists. This Note will not address the effectiveness of § 1983 as a remedy because
it does not apply to state constitutions. For a discussion of the statute, see Erwin Chemerinsky,
Federal Jurisdiction § 8 at 421-523 (Little, Brown, 2d. ed. 1994).
4. On facts very similar to the ones in this example, except that the police found
contraband, the New Mexico Court of Appeals, rejecting the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
Illinois v. Rodriguez, held that the consent of the third party was invalid and that the search
violated Article H, § 10 of the New Mexico Constitution. State v. Wright, 119 N.M. 559, 893 P.2d
455, 461 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995). See also State v. Lopez, 78 Hawaii 433, 896 P.2d 889, 901 (Hawaii
1995) (rejecting Rodriguez as a violation of Article I, § 7 of the Hawaii Constitution); State v.
Will, 131 Or. App. 498, 885 P.2d 715, 719 (1994) (rejecting Rodriguez under the Oregon
Constitution). But see State v. McCaughey, 127 Idaho 669, 904 P.2d 939, 944 (1995) (holding
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decisions notwithstanding, Section 1983 remains unavailable because,
as a federal remedy, it does not extend to violations of state law.5
Thus, without a direct claim under the state constitution for damages.
or a state provision comparable to Section 1983,6 the plaintiff will go
uncompensated for his loss, and he will not have his rights vindicated.
Furthermore, the government will go.unpunished for egregious acts
that were in direct violation of the state constitution. As a result, the
government will be undeterred from future unconstitutional conduct.
A direct cause of action for a constitutional. violation will
remedy the gap in an individual's ability to seek redress for breaches
of constitutional provisions. The concept of a "constitutional tort''7
first entered the American legal landscape in Bivens v. Six Unknown
Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics in 1971.8 Although common
law actions for trespass had long existed for illegal or unconstitutional
searches and seizures, Bivens was the first decision to allow a direct
that the "principles of Rodriguez apply equally to art. 1, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution"). See
generally Richard J. Cromer, Emerging Issues in State Constitutional Law: Search and Seizure
Decisions, 23 Search & Seizure L. Rep. 57, 59-60 (1996) (discussing Rodriguez and state decisions
rejecting its rationale on state constitutional grounds).
5. Phillips v. Youth Development Program, Inc., 390 Mass. 652, 459 N.E.2d 453, 457 n.4
(1983).
6. This Note will not examine the current status of state civil rights laws or other provi-
sions providing for damage suits based on the violation of a right secured by a state constitution.
It is worth noting, however, that some states have enacted legislation similar to § 1983. See, for
example, Ark. Stat. Ann. § 16-123-105 (1996); Cal. Civ. Code § 56.1 (West 1987); Mass. Gen.
Laws. Ann. ch 12, §§ 11-H to 11-I (West 1996); 5 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 4681 (1989); Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 20-148 (1987); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-5-60 (Law. Co-op. 1995). In light of these and other
remedies, though, some courts have refused to recognize direct constitutional damage claims or
have placed additional limitations upon them. See Part II.B.4.
Further, this Note will not address the exclusionary rule. Although it is a remedy, it
attaches only if the government wishes to use unconstitutionally obtained evidence in a criminal
trial. Constitutional tort actions, though, seek to provide a remedy for any person who suffers
harm from an unconstitutional act at the hands of the state, not just for criminal defendants.
For a discussion of the exclusionary rule as a remedy for a constitutional violation, see generally
William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 Va. L. Rev. 881 (1991);
Donald V. MacDougall, The Exclusionary Rule and Its Alternatives-Remedies for Constitutional
Violations in Canada and the United States, 76 J. Crim. L. & Criminol. 608 (1985). See also
State v. Bolt, 142 Ariz. 260, 689 P.2d 519, 527 (Ariz. 1984) (en bane) (discussing the
appropriateness of the replacement of the exclusionary rule with a Bivens-type action for a
violation of the Arizona Constitution); John C. Jeffries, Jr., Damages for Constitutional
Violations: The Relation. of Risk to Injury in Constitutional Torts, 75 Va. L. Rev. 1461, 1476-77
(1989) (discussing the use of constitutional torts in conjunction with the exclusionary rule
effectively to compensate and deter constitutional violations).
7. "A constitutional tort is any action for damages for [a] violation of a constitutional right
against a government or individual defendants" Brown v. State, 89 N.Y.2d 172, 674 N.E.2d
1129, 1132 (N.Y. 1986). The term first appeared in the title of an article discussing the Supreme
Court's decision in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). See Marshall S. Shapo, Constitutional
Tort. Monroe v. Pape, and the Frontiers Beyond, 60 Nw. U. L. Rev. 277 (1965).
8. 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (recognizing a cause of action for damages against federal agents
for conducting a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment).
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claim under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.9 Since
the Court's decision in Bivens, many state courts have addressed the
issue of constitutional tort claims for violations of state constitutional
provisions.10 In 1996 alone, three states, Colorado," New York,' 2 and
Utah,'3 joined the ranks of the many others that have confronted the
issue. However, in most of these decisions, as in Bivens, the courts
have failed to fully explore the extent of and need for government
liability.14
The development of constitutional torts recognizes that consti-
tutional rights and liberties are specific limitations and restrictions on
governments and must be enforceable.' 5 Courts must allow damage
suits, the traditional common law remedy, 6 not because many of the
rights parallel the interests protected by common law tort actions, but
because constitutions are enforceable in their own right.' 7 Thus, dam-
age actions should not require implementing legislation because con-
stitutions are specifically designed to place limitations on the political
branches.' 8 Although a balance must exist between vindication of
constitutional rights and effective, efficient government,'9  the
9. See Part IIA.
10. See Part II.B.
11. Board of County Comm'rs of Douglas County v. Sundheim, 926 P.2d 545, 549-53 (Colo.
1996) (en banc) (holding that an implied constitutional cause of action does not exist where
alternative remedies, such as § 1983 and common law torts, are available to remedy a denial of a
special land use permit).
12. Brown, 674 N.E.2d at 1138-39 (recognizing a constitutional cause of action for
violations of §§ 11 and 12 of the New York Constitution when black males had been
systematically stopped, detained, and interrogated without probable cause or reasonable suspi-
cion).
13. Bott v. Deland, 922 P.2d 732, 739 (Utah 1996) (concluding that Article I, § 9 of the Utah
Constitution allows for a damage claim by a prison inmate for failure to diagnose or provide
adequate medical care after repeated complaints and the filing of grievances concerning blurred
vision, severe headaches, nausea, dizziness, and body aches).
14. See Part MA.
15. See Susan Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-Executing Constitution, 68 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 289, 292 (1995).
16. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 395-96 (discussing damages as the traditional common law remedy
and listing cases); Brown, 674 N.E.2d at 1141 (same); Kelley Property Dev., Inc. v. Town of
Lebanon, 226 Conn. 314, 627 A.2d 909, 929 (1993) (Berdon, J., c6ncurring in part and dissenting
in part) (same); Moresi v. State, 567 So. 2d 1081, 1093 (La. 1990) (same); Christina B. Whitman,
Constitutional Torts, 79 Mich. L. Rev. 5, 41 (1980) (same).
17. Bandes, 68 S. Cal. L. Rev. at 291 (cited in note 15).
18. See notes 46, 212, 260 and accompanying text.
19. Perry M. Rosen, The Bivens Constitutional Tort: An Unfulfilled Promise, 67 N.C. L.
Rev. 337, 338 (1989); Sundheim, 926 P.2d at 550 (refusing to recognize an action for damages
under the Colorado Constitution because "[c]reating a new constitutional cause of action could
seriously alter the delicate balance between" the rights of aggrieved citizens and legitimate
government concerns).
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application of common law tort doctrines to constitutional law can
ensure adequate compensation for wronged plaintiffs while ensuring
that governments are not mired down in baseless suits. 20 Moreover,
damage awards are the only true remedy for the private citizen that
can ensure that government officials respect constitutional protec-
tions.
This Note examines the current state of direct causes of action
for damages under state constitutions and proposes that state courts
recognize constitutional tort actions under their respective state
constitutions. The Note explains that liability should be placed on the
government because government liability will ensure that the goals of
constitutional torts are adequately met.21 It further seeks to explain
the reasoning and rationale behind such causes of action.22 Finally,
the Note espouses several different theories upon which to base
constitutional torts.
23
20. See Kelley Property, 627 A.2d at 924 n.31 (noting that a common law culpability
requirement such as bad faith, malice, or improper motive will aid in limiting constitutional tort
liability for constitutional violations because "laypersons can conform their conduct without
knowing the contours of constitutional due process protections"). See Enid Campbell, Liability to
Compensate for Denial of a Right to a Fair Hearing, 15 Monash U. L. Rev. 383, 391 (1989) (noting
the use of fault or culpability to limit the liability of and burden on public utilities).
In addition to tort law, certain rules of civil procedure will also, if properly followed and en-
forced by courts, help to keep the disruptive effect of litigation at a tolerable level for govern-
ments. See, for example, F.R.C.P. 11 (providing for "appropriate sanction[s] upon the attorneys,
law firms, or parties" who have filed frivolous or improper law suits); F.R.C.P. 56 (authorizing
summary judgment whenever issues of material facts are not controverted). See also Butz v.
Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507-08 (1978) (relying on strict enforcement of summary judgment to
ensure that government agents are not harassed by frivolous constitutional tort claims).
Any fears that officials will be exposed to an enormous amount of personal liability under
Bivens have proven to be unwarranted. Perry M. Rosen notes that in the 10 years following the
Bivens decision, over 12,000 constitutional tort suits were filed. However, the plaintiffs were
only victorious in 30 of those suits. Rosen, 67 N.C. L. Rev. at 343 nn.40-42 (cited in note 19). See
also Peter H. Schuck, Suing Government: Citizen Remedies for Official Wrongs 202 (Yale U.,
1983) (compiling statistics concerning Bivens suits based on estimates prepared by the
Department of Jstice). Even though this fear has proven to be unfounded, the use of
institutional liability instead of personal liability should remove any additional concern that
government officials will not effectively and efficiently perform their jobs.
21. See Part III.
22. See Part IV.
23. See Part V.
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II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF ACTIONS FOR DAMAGES FOR VIOLATIONS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
A. The Foundation
Fundamental rights have long been enforced through damage
remedies.2 4 In common law England, any violation of the constitution,
including the Magna Carta,25 by a government official was a trespass
and was actionable in a case for damages, even without enabling
legislation from Parliament.26 These common law antecedents have
been influential as state courts have created direct causes of action
under state constitutions.2 7  Even the Supreme Court has relied upon
them.2
In Bivens, the Supreme Court recognized, for the first time, a
claim arising directly under the U.S. Constitution against federal
agents in their individual capacities for the violation of an individual's
24. See, for example, Kelley Property, 627 A.2d at 929 (Berdon, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (discussing the history of damage claims for violations of rights at common
law prior to the enactment of the Connecticut Constitution).
25. Damage suits were available for searches and seizures in violation of the Magna Carta.
Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (1763); Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (1763); Entick v.
Carrington and Three Other Messengers, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (1765). Further, any claim by
government officials that they were acting pursuant to legal authority, such as a facially valid
search warrant, was not a defense to liability: Such a claim could only be considered by the jury
on the issue of mitigation of damages. Wilkes, 98 Eng. Rep. at 499.
26. Ashby, 92 Eng. Rep. at 136 (Holt, C.J., dissenting). See Brown, 674 N.E.2d at 1139;
Moresi, 567 So. 2d at 1091 ('Under the common law of England, where individual rights, such as
those protected by Article 1, § 5 of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution, were preserved by a
fundamental document (e.g., the Magna Carta), a violation of those rights generally could be
remedied by a traditional action for damages."); Widgeon v. Eastern Shore Hosp. Center, 300 Md.
520, 479 A.2d 921, 924 (1984) ("Under the common law of England, where individual rights, such
as those protected by Article 26, where preserved by a fundamental document (e.g., the Magna
Carta), a violation of those rights generally could be remedied by a traditional action for
damages.") (listing cases).
Ashby is the quintessential constitutional tort case. It concerned the proper remedy for a
violation of the constitutional right to vote. The defendant had denied the plaintiff his right to
vote for a representative to the House of Commons because the defendant rejected the plaintiffs
status as a qualified elector. Ashby, 92 Eng. Rep. at 127. The plaintiff brought an action
sounding in trespass on the case. Although the verdict for the plaintiff was overturned by the
appellate court over the dissent of Lord Holt, it was reinstated by the House of Lords,
presumably approving of the arguments asserted by Lord Holt in his dissent. Campbell, 15
Monash U. L. Rev. at 389 (cited in note 20).
27. See note 26. See also State v. Tonn, 195 Iowa 94, 191 N.W. 530, 535 (1923) (recognizing
a claim for damages arising from an illegal search and seizure); Krehbiel v. Henkle, 152 Iowa 604,
129 N.W. 945 (1911) (same); Grunon v. Raymond, 1 Conn. 39, 47 (1814) (same).
28. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 395-96. See also Widgeon, 479 A.2d at 925 (discussing and listing
Supreme Court decisions embracing damage awards for violations of the Fourth Amendment).
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constitutional rights. 9 Although Bivens concerned a claim arising
under the Fourth Amendment,30 the Supreme Court has applied the
doctrine to violations of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment 3' and the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the
Eighth Amendment. 2 The Court, however, has often withheld liabil-
ity because of the availability of an equally effective alternative rem-
edy,33 because of "special factors counseling hesitation,"34 or because of
qualified immunity.35
In Bivens, the government performed a search and seizure
which violated the Fourth Amendment.3 6 The Supreme Court held
that the plaintiff could bring suit against the officers for violating his
Fourth Amendment rights.3 7 The Court rejected the notion that state
tort law should be relied upon to remedy unreasonable searches and
29. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 388. For a more complete overview of Bivens and its progeny, see
Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction § 9.1 at 523-44 (cited in note 3).
30. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397.
31. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 248-49 (1979).
32. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 24 (1980).
33. Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 368 (1983). The Court has held that exhaustion of admin-
istrative remedies is not a requirement of a Bivens cause of action when Congress has not
addressed the issue. McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 149 (1992).
34. Bush, 462 U.S. at 380. See also Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304 (1983)
(discussing the concept of "special factors counseling hesitation"); United States v. Stanley, 483
U.S. 669, 681-82 (1987) (same); Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 423 (1988) (same); FDIC v.
Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 484-85 (1994) (same).
35. In Butz v. Economou, the Court concluded that the qualified immunity available in a
§ 1983 action should also be available to defendants in a Bivens suit. Butz, 438 U.S. at 497-98.
Under the standard announced by the Court, qualified immunity would attach whenever the
defendant could assert "reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the time and in light of all
the circumstances, coupled with good-faith belief." Id. In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800
(1982), the Court refined the standard such that defendants would enjoy qualified immunity
"insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known." Id. at 818. For a further discussion of qualified
immunity, see note 248.
36. The plaintiff alleged that agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics illegally entered
his home and arrested him on drug charges in the presence of his family. Bivens, 403 U.S. at
389. They searched the apartment "from stem to stern." Id. The plaintiff was eventually taken
to a federal courthouse, interrogated, booked, and subjected to a visible strip search. Id.
37. Id. at 397. In FDIC v. Meyer, the Court addressed the issue of government liability and
held that an administrative agency could not be held liable for damages for violations of the U.S.
Constitution. Meyer, 510 U.S. at 479. A unanimous Court, per Justice Thomas, concluded that
government liability was inconsistent with the logic behind Bivens. Id. The Court determined
that because "the purpose of Bivens is to deter the officer," a claim against the government would
lose "the deterrent effects of the Bivens remedy." Id. Finally, the Court found a special factor
counseling hesitation: "a potentially enormous financial burden for the Federal Government."
Id. at 480. The Court disregarded any argument that the federal government was already
spending large sums of money to indemnify federal officials found liable for damages under
Bivens. Id. The Court declared that the issue of government liability was one of federal fiscal
policy to be determined by the political branches. Id.
1997] CONSTITUTIONAL TORT ACTIONS 1533
seizures 38 and based its holding on three observations: (1) the Court's
consistent rejection of the notion that the Fourth Amendment pro-
scribes only conduct that state law would condemn if engaged in by
private persons;39 (2) the recognition that the interests protected by
tresspass law and invasion of privacy may be inconsistent with or
even hostile to the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment's
guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures;40 and (3) the
recognition of damages as the ordinary remedy for an invasion of
personal liberty.41 Finally, the Court held that no "special factors
counseling hesitation" were present to defeat liability42 and that
neither an equally effective legislative remedy nor any congressional
bar to liability existed.
43
In his concurrence, Justice Harlan explained the propriety of a
damages award for the violation of a constitutionally protected
interest. First, he noted that the Court had often implied causes of
action for violations of federal statutes.4 Second, he addressed the
issue of judicial competence and concluded that the Court, if
competent to select remedies to implement statutory and common law
policies, is also competent to create remedies for violations of the
Constitution.45 Third, Justice Harlan outlined the inherent problems
of requiring that the majority enact enabling legislation: The Bill of
Rights was specifically designed to limit that majority.46 Finally,
38. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389-92. The majority also concluded that "[ain agent acting-albeit
unconstitutionally-in the name of the United States possesses a far greater capacity for harm
than an individual trespasser exercising no authority other than his own." Id. at 392.
39. Id. at 392.
40. Id. at 394. The Court noted that although an individual may have other remedies, such
as police protection, against a trespass committed by a private party, any attempt to stop a
federal official may amount to criminal conduct and have punitive consequences. Id. at 394-95.
41. Id. at 395 (listing cases and authorities). The Court also emphasized that damage
awards have often been implied for violations of federal statutes. Id. at 396.
42. Id. at 396.
43. Id. at 397.
44. Id. at 402 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan also wrote that if enabling legisla-
tion is necessary for a damage award, it must also necessarily be required for equitable relief. Id.
at 405 (Harlan, J., concurring).
45. Id. at 403-04 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan opined that "courts of law are
capable of making the types of judgment concerning causation and magnitude of injury necessary
to accord meaningful compensation for invasion of Fourth Amendment rights." Id. at 409
(Harlan, J., concurring). Because injunctions have long been used to remedy constitutional
violations without any enabling legislation, it stands to reason that damage awards are also
appropriate without such endorsement from Congress.
46. Justice Harlan explained:
But it must also be recognized that the Bill of Rights is particularly intended to vindicate
the interests of the individual in the face of the popular will as expressed in legislative
majorities; at the very least, it strikes me as no more appropriate to await express con-
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Justice Harlan underscored the value of deterrence when he asserted
that relief should not be denied simply because there can be no show-
ing that the remedy will not deter future lawlessness. 47 Justice
Harlan concluded his concurrence with his oft-quoted statement: "For
people in Bivens' shoes, it is damages or nothing."
B. The Status of State Constitutional Torts
Although many state courts have hesitated to create or imply
constitutional torts,49 some have embraced the idea. Currently, seven
states have recognized some form of action under their state constitu-
tion,50 and another three have embraced the idea when certain condi-
tions are met.51 Some nine state courts, although not finding a con-
stitutional tort appropriate in the case before them, have hinted that a
constitutional cause of action may be appropriate in certain circum-
stances. 52  In contrast, only seven states have flatly rejected such a
gressional authorization of traditional judicial relief with regard to these legal interests
than with respect to interests protected by federal statutes.
Id. at 407 (Harlan, J., concurring).
47. Id. at 408 (Harlan, J., concurring).
48. Id. at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring). The dissents of Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Blackmun and Black focused primarily upon the judicial impropriety of creating a damage claim.
See, for example, id. at 411-12 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Justices Black and Blackmun also
feared a major influx of cases in the federal courts. Id. at 428 (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 430
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
49. Sundheim, 926 P.2d at 552 (noting other courts' skepticism in cases involving licensing
and zoning determinations). The Supreme Court has also refused to hold the federal government
liable for the constitutional torts of federal officers. See note 37.
50. These states include: California, Fenton v. Groveland Community Serv. Dist., 185 Cal.
Rptr. 758, 763 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982); Illinois, Walinski v. Morrison & Morrison, 60 Ill. App. 3d 616,
377 N.E.2d 242, 245 (1978); Maryland, Widgeon, 479 A.2d at 930; New Jersey, Peper v. Princeton
Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 77 N.J. 55, 389 A.2d 465, 477-78 (1978); New York, Brown, 674 N.E.2d at
1138-39; Utah, Bott, 922 P.2d at 739; and Wisconsin, Old Truckway Associates v. City of
Greenfield, 80 Wis. 2d 254, 509 N.W.2d 323, 328 n.4 (Wis. 1993). See also Durant v. Michigan,
1997 WL 430992, 10-11 (Mich.). For a more complete listing of cases, see notes 55-62.
51. These states include: California, Gay Law Students Assoc. v. Pacific Telephone and
Telegraph Co., 24 Cal. 3d 458, 595 P.2d 592, 597-98 (1979); Louisiana, Moresi, 567 So. 2d at
1091-92; North Carolina, Corum v. University of North Carolina, 330 N.C. 761, 413 S.E.2d 276,
289-93 (1992).
52. These states include: Alaska, Thoma v. Hickel, 1997 WL 468070, 8, 9 n.5 (Alaska);
Arizona, Knutson v. County of Maricopa, 175 Ariz. 445, 857 P.2d 1299, 1301 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993);
Connecticut, Kelley Property, 627 A.2d at 923; Florida, Schreiner v. McKenzie Tank Lines & Risk
Management, Inc., 408 So. 2d 711, 713 (Fla. Ct. App. 1982); Massachusetts, Phillips, 459 N.E.2d
at 457; Michigan, Smith v. Department of Public Health, 428 Mich. 540, 410 N.W.2d 749, 750
(1987); New Hampshire, Rockhouse Mountain Prop. Owners Assoc. v. Town of Conway, 127 N.H.
593, 503 A.2d 1385, 1388-89 (1986); North Dakota, Livingood v. Meece, 477 N.W.2d 183, 195
(N.D. 1991); Vermont, Shields v. Gerhart, 163 Vt. 219, 658 A.2d 924, 934 (1995).
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cause of action.53 Some federal courts have even been asked to address
the issue and attempt to predict or interpret state law in cases
involving supplemental state constitutional tort claims.54
The cases addressing the issue of state constitutional torts,
based on their rationale and the constitutional provision involved, fall
into one of five categories: (1) courts openly embracing constitutional
damage suits; (2) courts refusing to recognize a cause of action because
of "special factors counseling hesitation;" (3) courts evading the issue
because of sovereign immunity; (4) courts depending upon the absence
of alternative remedies; and (5) courts refusing to recognize
constitutional torts and requiring implementing legislation.
1. Independent Causes of Action for Damages Arising Directly
under State Constitutions
Some plaintiffs have convinced state courts to recognize direct
claims for damages for violations of several constitutional provisions
53. These states includes: Colorado, Sundheim, 926 P.2d at 548; Hawaii, Figueroa v. State,
61 Haw. 369, 604 P.2d 1198, 1206-07 (Hawaii 1980); Ohio, Provens v. Stark County Bd. of Mental
Retardation & Dev. Disabilities, 64 Ohio St. 3d 252, 594 N.E.2d 959, 965 (1992); Oregon, Hunter
v. City of Eugene, 309 Or. 298, 787 P.2d 881, 884 (1990); Tennessee, Lee v. Ladd, 834 S.W.2d 323,
325 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992); Texas, City of Beaumont v. Bouillion, 38 Tex. Sup. J. 282, 896 S.W.2d
143, 148 (Tex. 1995); Wyoming, Cooney v. Park County, 792 P.2d 1287, 1298 (Wyo. 1990). See
also Bontwell v. Department of Corrections, 226 Ga. App. 524, 486 S.E.2d 917, 921-22 (1997)
(refusing to address the issue of constitutional tort actions under the Georgia Constitution
because of the immunity which the Georgia Constitution creates for government officials engaged
in official conduct).
In addition, some states need not address the issue and have not because of civil rights laws
and implementing legislation for statutory claims for violations of state constitutional rights and
provisions. See, for example, Ark. Stat. Ann. § 16-123-105; 5 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 4681; Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 20-148; S.C. Code Ann. § 16-5-60. However, some state courts in states with such
legislation have still addressed the issue of direct causes of action. See, for example, Fenton, 185
Cal. Rptr. at 788 (addressing the issue of state constitutional torts in spite of Cal. Civ. Code
§ 56.1 (West 1987)); Phillips, 459 N.W.2d at 453 (addressing the issue of state constitutional torts
in spite of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12, §§ 11-H to 11-1).
54. Taylor v. Rhode Island, 726 F. Supp. 895, 900 (D.R.I. 1989) ("Although this issue re-
mains undecided by any Rhode Island state court, it appears to this writer that the new 'due
process' and 'equal protection' provisions in Article I, Section 2 [of the Rhode Island Constitution]
create constitutional causes of action against state actors in certain circumstances."); Jones v.
Rhode Island, 724 F. Supp. 25, 35 (D.R.I. 1989) (concluding that it must have been the intent of
the drafters to create "an implicit right to sue state actors for damages" for violations of Article I,
Section 2 of the Rhode Island Constitution); Barlow v. Avco Corp., 527 F. Supp. 269, 273 (E.D.
Va. 1981) (holding that "there is a private cause of action under [Article 1, Section 11] of the
Virginia Constitution"). But see Harbin v. City of Alexandria, 712 F. Supp. 67, 73-74 n.7 (E.D.
Va. 1989) (refusing to address the issue of a Bivens-type claim under the Virginia Constitution
because it "may well raise novel state issues more appropriately resolved in state courts").
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including equal protection,55 the right to be free from discrimination in
employment,56 due process, 5 7 search and seizure,58 cruel and unusual
punishment, 59 the right to vote,60 the rights of free speech and free
press, 61 and constitutional duties to fund certain activities.6 2
Recent decisions of the Supreme Court of Utah and the New
York Court of Appeals delineate the legal concepts behind direct
causes of action. In Bott v. Deland,s3 the Utah Supreme Court, in a
unanimous opinion, held that a direct cause of action could be brought
for violations of the state constitution's prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment.64 The court used a two-part analysis to deter-
mine if an action for damages should lie. First, the court addressed
the self-executing nature of the right.5 Second, the court examined
the adequacy of an award of damages as a remedy for constitutional
violations.66 The court quickly concluded that the provision was self-
executing.67 With respect to the appropriate remedy, the court exam-
ined the alternative, injunctive relief, and held that such an award
could not remedy the harm Bott had suffered.68 The court recognized
that even if the constitutional right violated was not clearly
55. Brown, 674 N.E.2d at 1139; Ashton v. Brown, 339 Md. 70, 660 A.2d 447, 462 (1995).
56. Lloyd v. Borough of Stone Harbor, 179 N.J. Super. 496, 432 A.2d 572, 577-80 (N.J.
Super Ct. Ch. Div. 1981). Note that at least two cases involved the liability of private employers
because the non-discrimination clauses in the state constitutions reached all employers, not just
state actors. Peper, 389 A.2d at 477-78; Walinski, 377 N.E.2d at 245. Thus, constitutional rights
which contain no state action requirement may give rise to civil liability between two entirely
private parties in some states.
57. Ashton, 660 A.2d at 462; State v. Meade, 101 Md. App. 512, 647 A.2d 830, 838 (1994);
Old Truckway, 509 N.W.2d at 328 n.4; Clea v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 312 Md. 662,
541 A-2d 1303, 1311-14 (1988); Widgeon, 479 A.2d at 930.
58. Brown, 674 N.E.2d at 1139; Meade, 647 A.2d at 838; Clea, 541 A.2d at 1311-14;
Widgeon, 479 A.2d at 930; Terranova v. State, 445 N.Y.S.2d 965, 969-70 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1982);
Mayes v. Till, 266 So. 2d 578, 580 (Miss. 1972).
59. Bott, 922 P.2d at 739.
60. Fenton, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 763.
61. Laguna Publishing Co. v. Golden Rain Foundation of Laguna, 182 Cal. Rptr. 813, 835
(Cal. Ct. App. 1982).
62. Durant, 1997 WL 430992 at 9-10.
63. 922 P.2d 732 (Utah 1996). The plaintiff was a prisoner who was refused medical
treatment for an eye ailment after repeated complaints about his vision as well as severe
headaches, nausea, dizziness, and body aches. He filed two grievances over a three-week period
before he received any medical attention. By the time he was treated, he had developed malig-
nant hypertension and severe renal failure and had suffered a major reduction of his life
expectancy. Id. at 735-36.
64. Id. at 737.
65. Id. at 739.
66. Id.
67. The court noted that English and American courts have often enforced the prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment without implementing legislation. Id. at 738. For a
discussion of self-execution, see note 84.
68. Bott, 922 P.2d at 739.
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established,69  the plaintiff deserved damages because the
constitutional provision at issue was self-executing.70 Finally, the
court held that no immunity or other limitation upon liability should
attach because "[t]he actions of officials are apparently authorized by
the law, and an 'agent acting... in the name of the state possesses a
far greater capacity for harm than an individual trespasser exercising
no authority other than his own.' "71
In Brown v. State,72 the New York Court of Appeals addressed
the viability of a class action suit against the state73 brought on behalf
of African-American males whom police officers had stopped, interro-
gated, and examined, presumably without probable cause or reason-
able suspicion.74 The court began by examining the self-executing
nature of Section 1175 and Section 1276 of the New York Constitution
and concluded that the Sections created judicially enforceable rights
and "a basis for judicial relief against the State if those rights are
violated."77  The court then turned to the propriety of allowing an
award of damages and concluded that it was the intent of the drafters
69. For a discussion of the clearly established right requirement, see note 248.
70. Bott, 922 P.2d at 739.
71. Id. (quoting Moresi, 657 So. 2d at 1093).
72. 89 N.Y.2d 172, 674 N.E.2d 1129 (1996).
73. In this case, the court did not hold that respondeat superior liability should apply to
the state because of any common law or constitutional doctrine. Rather, the court concluded that
vicarious liability must apply because of the New York Court of Claims Act. Id. at 1142. Thus,
the Court of Appeals, in at least a limited respect, allowed the legislature to define this
particular facet of the tort.
74. Id. at 1131. The court noted that "[the interrogations were systematic, consisting of a
'stop' followed by questions regarding potential involvement in the [assault of an elderly white
woman], requests for alibis, and an inspection of the students' hands and forearms." Id.
75. Section 11 provides:
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of this state or any subdivision
thereof. No person shall, because of race, color, creed or religion, be subjected to any dis-
crimination in his civil rights by any other person or by any firm, corporation, or institu-
tion, or by the state or any agency or subdivision of the state.
N.Y. Const., § 11. The first sentence follows the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment almost verbatim. See U.S. Const., Amend. XIV.
76. Section 12 reads in relevant part:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized ....
N.Y. Cost., § 12. This provision of the New York Constitution is almost identical to the Fourth
Amendment. See U.S. Const., Amend. IV.
77. Brown, 674 N.E.2d at 1137.
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of the New York Constitution to allow for such a remedy.7s Finally,
the court rejected any argument that the plaintiffs should be limited
to common law torts because this limitation would allow for the
vindication of common law rights but not constitutional guarantees. 79
Despite the claims of the dissent,8° the court declared that damages
are necessary to deter the government's misconduct 8' because they
78. Id. at 1139. In addition to relying on New York's own constitutional history, the court
reviewed the Supreme Court's decision in Bivens, § 874A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
and the English common law of "constitutional torts." Id. at 1138.
79. Id. at 1140-41. The court went on to note:
Common law tort rules are heavily influenced by overriding concerns of adjusting losses
and allocating risks, matters that have little relevance when constitutional rights are at
stake. Moreover, the duties imposed upon government officers by these provisions ad-
dress something far more serious than the private wrongs regulated by the common law.
To confine claimants to tort causes of action would produce the paradox that individuals,
guilty or innocent, wrongly arrested or detained may seek a monetary recovery because
the complaint fits within the framework of a common law tort, whereas these claimants,
who suffered similar indignities, must go remediless because the duty violated was
spelled out in the State Constitution.
Id. at 1141.
In addition, the court noted that common law causes of action serve to protect plaintiffs
against trespasses by private individuals, whereas constitutional provisions are specifically
designed to limit government and its agents, those who have far greater potential to harm
others. See id.
80. The dissent claimed, among other things, that damage awards for constitutional viola-
tions would open the flood gates to suits against the state. Id. at 1152 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
The majority rejected this assertion, reasoning that concerns about the number of cases cannot
outweigh the effect of the government's immoral conduct. Id. at 1143. Justice Brennan
addressed this sentiment in his seminal piece on state constitutional rights:
It is true, of course, that there has been an increasing amount of litigation of all types
filling the calendars of virtually every state and federal court. But a solution that shuts
the courthouse door in the face of the litigant with a legitimate claim for relief, particu-
larly a claim of deprivation of a constitutional right, seems to he not only the wrong tool
but also a dangerous tool for solving the problem. The victims of the use of that tool are
most often the litigants most in need of judicial protection of their rights-the poor, the
underprivileged, the deprived minorities. The very lifeblood of courts is popular confi-
dence that they mete out evenhanded justice and any discrimination that denies these
groups access to the courts for resolution of their meritorious claims unnecessarily risks
loss of that confidence.
William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 Harv. L.
Rev. 489, 498 (1977). This is a more logical conclusion, as it is improper or at least illogical to
sacrifice constitutional claims for the sake of conserving judicial resources especially since it is
constitutions that create courts and vest judicial power in them.
81. Brown, 674 N.E.2d at 1141. The court further rejected any claim that other remedies
should be pursued, and it noted the deterrent value of damages:
The remedies now recognized, injunctive or declaratory relief, all fall short. Claimants
are not charged with any crime as a result of their detention and thus exclusion has no
deterrent value. Claimants had no opportunity to obtain injunctive relief before the inci-
dents described and no ground to support an order enjoining future wrongs. For those in
the claimants' position "it is damages or nothing."
Id. (quoting Bivens, 403 U.S. at 409 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
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advance the underlying purposes of the constitutional provisions at
issue.8
2
Bott and Brown indicate that so long as there has been a viola-
tion of a constitutional provision, a cause of action can proceed.8 3
Before a constitutional provision can be violated, though, it must be
self-executing such that the provision defines tangible rights personal
to the plaintiff which may be enforced if transgressed8 4 However, the
courts that have recognized independent causes of action have reached
three far more important conclusions in the course of their
deliberations: (1) violations of constitutional rights and guarantees
82. Id. at 1139-40.
83. See also Widgeon, 479 A.2d at 929 ("Thus, the existence of other available remedies, or
a lack thereof, is not a persuasive basis for resolution of the issue before us.").
84. The Supreme Court of Utah recently described the concept of self-executing provisions:
A constitutional provision is self-executing if it articulates a rule sufficient to give effect
to the underlying rights and duties intended by the framers.... In other words, courts
may give effect to a provision without implementing legislation if the framers intended
the provision to have immediate effect and if "no ancillary legislation is necessary to the
enjoyment of a right given, or the enforcement of a duty imposed."... Conversely, con-
stitutional provisions are not self-executing if they merely indicate a general principle or
line of policy without supplying the means for putting them into effect.
Bott, 922 P.2d at 737 (citations omitted).
In determining when a provision is self-executing, state courts often look at the text of the
provision, its legislative history, the relationship between the provision and other clauses of the
constitution, and the intent of the framers or voters approving the provision. Shields, 658 A.2d
at 928-29 (relying on the text); Durant, 1997 VL 430992 at 11 (relying on voter intent); Bonner v.
City of Santa Ana, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 671, 675 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (relying on voter intent); Bott,
922 P.2d at 737 (relying on the intent of the framers of the Utah Constitution); Schreiner, 408
So. 2d at 714 (relying on voter intent). Often, however, courts simply presume provisions of a
constitution are self-executing. Fenton, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 762; Laguna Publishing Co., 182 Cal.
Rptr. at 834 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982). Some state constitutions dictate such an interpretation.
Figueroa, 604 P.2d at 1205; Walinski, 377 N.E.2d at 245.
Determining that a provision is self-executing is generally not a per se guarantee that a
claim for damages will attach for its violation. Brown, 674 N.E.2d at 1138 ("The violation of a
self-executing provision in the Constitution will not always support a claim for damages,
however."); Shields, 658 A.2d at 930; Figueroa, 604 P.2d at 1206 ("No case has construed the
term 'self-executing' as allowing money damages for constitutional violations."). In 1996,
however, the Supreme Court of Utah became the first court to declare that the violation of a self-
executing provision automatically gives rise to a claim for damages. Bott, 922 P.2d at 739.
Some courts have declared the existence of constitutional tort actions only to find the theory
inapplicable to the case at bar because the constitution was not violated, Carlton v. Department
of Corrections, 215 Mich. App. 490, 546 N.W.2d 671, 680-81 (1996); Johnson v. Wayne County,
213 Mich. App. 143, 540 N.W.2d 66, 69-71 (1995); Phillips, 459 N.E.2d at 660; Schreiner, 408
So. 2d at 714; or the right violated was not clearly established, Melbourne Corp. v. City of
Chicago, 76 Ill. App. 3d 595, 394 N.E.2d 1291, 1297 (1979). Other courts have avoided the
recognition of the cause of action because either no constitutional right was transgressed,
Maricopa, 857 P.2d at 1301; Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Todd, 813 P.2d 508, 510 n.1 (Okla. 1991);
or because the provision of the constitution at issue was not self-executing, Sabia v. State, 164
Vt. 293, 669 A.2d 1187, 1199 (1995).
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may be vindicated through an action for damages; 85 (2) courts have not
only the power but also the duty to create such causes of action;86 and
(3) fears of overburdening the courts' limited resources should not bar
recovery.87
2. "Special Factors Counseling Hesitation:" The Refusal to
Create Liability
Some courts have refused to find liability based on the amor-
phous concept of "special factors counseling hesitation."88 These spe-
cial factors usually center around public policy concerns involving
unconstitutional legislation,89 fears of potentially unending liability,90
or constitutional provisions no longer in existence. 91 The doctrine,
though, has been the focal point of criticism.92 Although the concerns
of the courts often have some merit, the "special factors" doctrine
creates a far too tempting excuse to leave a plaintiff without a remedy.
Instead, courts should focus on the constitutional right in question
and should permit a cause of action to go forward whenever a right
personal to the plaintiff has been violated. For instance, in the area of
unconstitutional legislation, a plaintiff might only recover if he can
prove that his specific rights were violated, not through some custom
or policy, but by actual government conduct with respect to him or a
85. This conclusion is often based upon traditional tort law principles and the English
custom of providing money damages for violations of individual rights. Bott, 922 P.2d at 739;
Widgeon, 479 A.2d at 924 (citing Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (1765); Wilkes, 98
Eng. Rep. at 489; Huckle, 95 Eng. Rep. at 768).
86. For example, the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that it has the power to enforce
constitutional rights even in the absence of implementing legislation. Peper, 389 A.2d at 476.
The court noted that "[jiust as the Legislature cannot abridge constitutional rights by its
enactments, it cannot curtail them through its silence, and the judicial obligation to protect the
fundamental rights of individuals is as old as this country" Id. (citing King v. South Jersey Natl.
Bank, 66 N.J. 161, 330 A.2d 1, 10 (1974)). See also Widgeon, 479 A.2d at 929 (Thus, the
existence of other available remedies, or a lack thereof, is not a persuasive basis for resolution of
the issue [of constitutional tort claims].").
87. See note 80 and accompanying text.
88. This concept was first noted in Bivens and has since been used by many courts,
especially in the federal arena to deny liability. See note 34 and accompanying text;
Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction § 9.1.3 at 531-34 (cited in note 3).
89. Vest v. Schafer, 757 P.2d 588, 598 (Alaska 1988); 77th Dist. Judge v. State, 175 Mich.
App. 681, 438 N.W.2d 333, 340 (1987); Alaska Pacific Assurance Co. v. Brown, 687 P.2d 264, 276
(Alaska 1984). But see Ashton, 660 A.2d at 461-62 (holding that in a constitutional tort claim
based on an arrest made pursuant to an unconstitutional ordinance, the fact that the arrest was
made pursuant to a law was not a defense to liability).
90. Kelley Property, 627 A.2d at 923-24; King v. Alaska State Housing Authority, 633 P.2d
256, 260-61 (Alaska 1981).
91. Smith, 410 N.W.2d at 789.
92. Gene R. Nichol, Bivens, Chilicky, and Constitutional Damages Claims, 75 Va. L. Rev.
1117, 1124 (1989) (describing the doctrine as "curious").
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cognizable group of which he is a member. The legislative enactment
alone cannot sustain liability, but its implementation and effect on
specific individuals can. The law must not be unconstitutional simply
because it violates some structural limitation of the government or its
legislative powers, such as a federal staute which is void because it
violates the Tenth Amendment or is not a valid exercise of the
commerce power. Rather, the law must actually result in the violation
of a constitutional right personal to the plaintiff which occurs when
the unconstitutional statute is applied to the plaintiff.
93
3. Sovereign Immunity as a Bar to Recovery
One of the most ominous obstacles facing plaintiffs in constitu-
tional tort litigation is sovereign immunity. Courts have invoked this
doctrine not only to bar recovery against the government 94 but also as
an excuse not to recognize direct causes of action at all.95 The concept
93. See Sheldon Nahmod, Constitutional Damages and Corrective Justice: A Different
Vriew, 76 Va. L. Rev. 997, 1011-12 (1990) (arguing that liability should attach for both "systemic
rights" and "personal rights"). It is absurd that a plaintiff will remain uncompensated when, for
example, police officers violate his rights while acting pursuant to a law, whereas when an agent
following a general government policy that happens to be unconstitutional violates a plaintiffs
rights, that plaintiff will be able to recover. Atrocities that the executive branch commits but the
legislature endorses should not go without a remedy.
Further, constitutional issues largely concern the due process and equal protection require-
ments in state constitutions. In the equal protection arena, the state of mind requirement for a
violation will often curb liability. For due process, it may be appropriate for the courts to take a
duty approach. However, courts should not simply dismiss constitutional tort claims in these
areas because they pose difficult questions. Courts should abandon the special factor analysis
and delineate clear standards in order to determine when these clauses are violated and when
liability attaches. Nevertheless, the scope of liability for specific provisions of state constitutions
is beyond the scope of this Note.
94. Bontwell, 486 S.E.2d at 921-22; Garcia v. Reyes, 697 So. 2d 549, 551 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1997); Murphy v. State, 248 Mont. 82, 809 P.2d 16, 19 (1991); Ritchie v. Donnelly, 324 Md. 344,
597 A.2d 432, 444 (1991); Meade, 647 A-2d at 835; Marshall v. Ilczuk, 1993 WL 642946, 5 (D. Md.
1994); Vest, 757 P.2d at 598 n.40.
95. Sundheim, 926 P.2d at 549; Anderson v. Department of Revenue, 313 Or. 1, 828 P.2d
1001, 1005 (1992); Livingood, 477 N.W.2d at 189-90; Hunter, 787 P.2d at 883; Rockhouse
Mountain Prop. Owners, 503 A.2d at 1389; Figueroa, 604 P.2d at 1205. In some of these cases, it
is unclear whether constitutional tort claims would exist against officials sued in their individual
capacity. See Livingood, 477 N.W.2d at 195 (failing to address constitutional tort claims against
an official in his individual capacity because it was not properly preserved for appeal); Figueroa,
604 P.2d at 120 (addressing only the liability of the state). But see Hunter, 787 P.2d at 884
(holding that "persons whose rights under Article I, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution are
violated by a municipality or its employees may not bring an action for damages against the
municipality or its employees directly under the constitution, but will be limited to existing
common-law, equitable, and statutory remedies").
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of sovereign immunity stems from statutes and constitutions,96 as well
as from the common law.97 The result, however, is often the same:
The aggrieved plaintiff cannot recover from the state for the
unconstitutional conduct of the state's employees. 98
Many courts, however, have held that sovereign immunity does
not apply to constitutional torts. In these cases, courts generally hold
that the state's immunity statute either specifically exempts
constitutional torts99 or, conversely, that the statute does not grant
immunity to cases involving constitutional deprivations. 1 ° Some
courts, however, have specifically abrogated sovereign immunity for
constitutional torts because of its inherent incompatibility with
constitutional violations.101
The most notable of these cases is the recent decision of the
North Carolina Supreme Court in Corum v. University of North
Carolina.°2 In that case, the court held that the judicially created
doctrine of sovereign immunity could not exist in the face of alleged
violations of the North Carolina Constitution. 0° The court noted that
96. See, for example, Sundheim, 926 P.2d at 549 (relying on the immunity contained in the
Colorado Governmental Immunity Act); Anderson, 828 P.2d at 1005 (relying on the immunity
contained in the Oregon Tort Claims Act); Bontwell, 486 S.E.2d at 921-22 (relying on the
immunity contained in the Georgia Constitution).
97. See, for example, Livingood, 477 N.W.2d at 189-90 (refusing to abrogate judicially
created immunity); Rockhouse Mountain Prop. Owners, 503 A.2d at 1389 (same); 77th Dist.
Judge, 438 N.W.2d at 340 (applying common law legislative immunity to bar a constitutional tort
suit). The Maryland Court of Appeals more fully explained the concept of common law
immunity:
The "State" spoken of in this rule [of sovereign immunity] "itself is an ideal person, in-
tangible, invisible, immutable," which can "act only by law, [and] whatever it does say
and do must be lawful." When the State's agents act wrongly, their acts are ultra vires,
and it is "the mere wrong and trespass of those individual persons...."
Ritchie, 597 A.2d at 444. This concept, however, runs contrary to the law of agency and the law
of corporations. See Catharine Pierce Wells, Corrective Justice and Corporate Tort Liability, 69
S. Cal. L. Rev. 1769, 1774 (1996) (noting that corporations law and respondeat superior both hold
the greater or parent entity liable for the actions of the lesser).
98. But see Meade, 647 A.2d at 834 (discussing indemnity funds with which the
government would indemnify police officers in civil suits); Brown, 674 N.E.2d at 1142 ("[In many
cases the State will be secondarily liable for the employees' acts because it has assumed the
obligation to defend and indemnify them.").
99. See Brown, 674 N.E.2d at 1142; Strauss v. State, 131 N.J. Super. 571, 330 A.2d 646,
649 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1974).
100. See Smith, 410 N.W.2d at 793 (Boyle, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Clark v. City of Chicago, 595 F, Supp. 482, 486 & n.6 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
101. See Bott, 922 P.2d at 736; Corum, 413 S.E.2d at 291; Smith, 410 N.W.2d at 793 (Boyle,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Fenton, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 763 (concluding that the
state immunity statute did not apply because "[t]he state constitutional right to vote is contained
in a self-executing provision, which a governmental entity may not violate without standing
accountable for any provable damages").
102. 330 N.C. 761, 413 S.E.2d 276 (1992).
103. Id. at 291.
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although the legislature traditionally determines when the sovereign
is liable, the judiciary's responsibility to protect and enforce the state's
Declaration of Rights was paramount.104 The court concluded that
sovereign immunity could not trump constitutional tort claims be-
cause sovereign immunity is not a constitutional right of the state but
merely a common law doctrine subject to the constraints of the consti-
tution.10 5 Thus, the court resolved the paradox between constitutional
torts and sovereign immunity in favor of constitutional accountability:
The rights are designed to limit and restrict the reach of government;
thus sovereign immunity effectively bars the vindication of those
rights when the government transgresses them.1°6  Sovereign
immunity must give way in the face of a constitutional tort claim.
4. Limiting the Constitution through the Legislature:
The Existence of an Alternative Remedy
Several courts have refused to create a direct cause of action for
damage awards under a state constitution because of the availability
of alternative remedies. 10 7 These cases have involved employment
disputes and discrimination,108 contract bidding, °9 licensing and
zoning determinations,"0 and dissemination of private information."'
They have denied direct relief under the state constitution because
104. Id.
105. Id. at 291-92. The court went on to state that "[tihus, when there is a clash between
these constitutional rights and sovereign immunity, the constitutional rights must prevail." Id.
at 292.
106. Id. at 291-92. The court concluded:
It would indeed be a fanciful gesture to say on the one hand that citizens have constitu-
tional individual civil rights that are protected from encroachment actions by the State,
while on the other hand saying that individuals whose constitutional rights have been
violated by the State cannot sue because of the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
Id. at 291.
107. Although not creating a cause of action in the case before them, some courts have
indicated that a constitutional tort may very well be appropriate in the absence of an alternative
remedy. See, for example, Shields, 658 A.2d at 934.
108. Provens, 594 N.E.2d at 961; Irving v. School District No. 1-1A, 248 Mont. 460, 813 P.2d
417, 420 (1991); Walt v. State, 751 P.2d 1345, 1353 (Alaska 1988); State v. Haley, 687 P.2d 305,
318 (Alaska 1984).
109. Dick Fischer Develop. No. 2, Inc. v. Department of Administration, 838 P.2d 263, 268
(Alaska 1992).
110. Sundheim, 926 P.2d at 553; Shields, 658 A.2d at 934; Kelley Property, 627 A.2d at 922;
Rockhouse Mountain Prop. Owners, 503 A.2d at 1388.
111. Thoma, 1997 WL 468070 at 8, 9 n.5.
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other remedies existed: administrative remedies,112 statutory causes
of action,"13 common law torts,"4 criminal prosecutions,"11 injunctive
relief,116 and even Section 1983 claims." 7 Often, however, alternative
remedies provide only equitable relief, not actual relief for a dep-
rivation of constitutional rights.
Shields v. Gerhart"5  demonstrates the rationales most
commonly advanced' to deny direct constitutional relief. After
determining that certain provisions of the Vermont Constitution were
self-executing,"1 the Supreme Court of Vermont turned to the
propriety of a claim for damages. The court reviewed the Bivens line
of cases and determined that where "other remedies exist as part of a
statutory scheme fashioned by the legislature, the decisions show
reluctance to add a damages remedy."120 The court held that because
the plaintiff had administrative remedies available to her, a damage
suit would not lie for the alleged unconstitutional denial of her
operating license.' 2' Further, the plaintiff did not convince the court
112. Shields, 658 A.2d at 935-36; Kelley Property, 627 A.2d at 923; Dick Fischer, 838 P.2d at
268; Provens, 594 N.E.2d at 965-66; Walt, 751 P.2d at 1353.
113. Provens, 594 N.E.2d at 965-66; Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 813 P.2d at 520 (Opala, C.J.,
concurring); Rockhouse Mountain Prop. Owners, 503 A.2d at 1388; Thoma, 1997 WL 468070 at 8.
114. Sundheim, 926 P.2d at 553 n.13 (relying on the existence of claims for intentional
interference with contractual relations or intentional interference with a prospective business
advantage to deny liability under the Colorado Constitution).
115. Cooney, 792 P.2d at 1298 n.7.
116. Herrick's Aero-Auto-Aqua Repair Service v. State, 754 P.2d 1111, 1116 (Alaska 1988).
117. Sundheim, 926 P.2d at 553 n.13; Irving, 813 P.2d at 419. These courts, however, fail to
understand the most fundamental purpose behind state constitutional torts: vindication of state
constitutional rights. As § 1983 does not permit recovery for state rights, it is ultimately
irrelevant that the actions of the defendant may also violate the U.S. Constitution and give rise
to liability under the statute. Fear of double recovery is also misplaced because of the common
law rule prohibiting such recovery. Compare Sundheim, 926 P.2d at 553 n.13 ("In particular,
[these damages] are recoverable under the plaintiffs § 1983 claims and therefore all damages
sought here are merely duplicative.") with Widgeon, 479 A.2d at 928 (concluding that the
availability of a § 1983 or other common law cause of action was irrelevant to the determination
of whether a state constitutional tort action should lie).
118. 163 Vt. 219, 658 A.2d 924 (1995). The plaintiff claimed that she had been denied her
property interest in her day care center in violation of the Vermont Constitution. She alleged
that the defendants had revoked her license because of her support for corporal punishment.
Further, she claimed that the defendants defrauded her into forgoing her appeal rights and
applying for a license as a registered facility for which they allegedly knew she would not qualify.
Id. at 926.
119. Id. at 930.
120. Id. at 933. The court also reviewed its own application of § 874A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts and concluded that damage awards for violations of a statute are not usually
available under Vermont law when another remedy exists. Id. at 932-33. For a discussion of
§ 874A, see Part V.C.
121. Shields, 658 A.2d at 936. The court stressed that a damage suit and the potential of
liability for government officials may have a "chilling effect" on those officials who are employed
to oversee day care facilities and to protect the health and safety of children. Id.
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that the statutory remedies were inadequate because the plaintiff was
tricked into forgoing them. 122  Thus, the plaintiff was not afforded
compensation for the loss of her property rights, even if they were
intentionally or maliciously denied, because there was an
administrative remedy in place allowing for the review and appeal of
the initial denial of the license.
123
In contrast to Shields, two courts have upheld constitutional
torts but have permitted liability only in the absence of legislative or
administrative remedies. In Gay Law Students Association v. Pacific
Telephone and Telegraph Co.,124 the Supreme Court of California
concluded that a claim of employment discrimination in violation of
the California Constitution could proceed because no statutory remedy
existed for such unconstitutional behavior. 25 The court specifically
limited its holding to those cases in which no other remedies were
available.12
6
The Supreme Court of North Carolina reached a similar con-
clusion in Corum.127  In that decision, the court concluded that a
violation of the right to free speech in the North Carolina Constitution
could support a common law action for damages provided that no
other remedy existed.128  The court noted that although it had the
inherent power to create remedies for constitutional violations, it
should defer to the decision of the legislature and should "minimze
the encroachment upon other branches of government-in appearance
and in fact-by seeking the least intrusive remedy available and
necessary to right the wrong." 129 Because the legislature had not yet
spoken on the issue and because damages were the least intrusive
122. Id. at 935.
123. The court noted that any initial denial of due process could be rectified at a later date
by filing an appeal in court. Id. at 936. This remedy, however, fails to compensate the plaintiff
for any loss she may have suffered from the time due process was first denied to the time the
decision could have been overturned and corrected by a court of law. In addition, the remedy
afforded in Shields and other cases in no way addresses the need for deterrence. Presumably, an
unconstitutional decision denying a license will be overturned on appeal, but neither the gov-
ernment nor the responsible government officials will be held accountable for their violations of
the state constitution. This result seems highly incompatible with the purpose behind a guaran-
tee of constitutional rights and government responsibility to the citizen. Further, it permits the
legislature to define the scope of constitutional law, a function traditionally reserved for the
apolitical judiciary.
124. 24 Cal. 3d 458, 595 P.2d 592 (1979).
125. Id. at 602.
126. Id. at 602 n.10.
127. 413 S.E.2d at 276.
128. Id. at 290-92.
129. Id. at 291.
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remedy for the constitutional violation, the court recognized a
constitutional tort action.'30
These cases leave two issues unresolved: (1) whether the
legislature has the power to interpret the scope of constitutional rights
and constitutional remedies; and (2) whether the courts should defer
to those interpretations. Because courts have the common law power
to create remedies and the duty to enforce constitutional protections,13'
the availability or absence of legislative remedies should be irrelevant,
especially since the legislature has no power to abrogate truly consti-
tutional remedies. 1 2 Often, statutes and common law torts do not rec-
ognize or preserve the important constitutional interests at stake.'
.The availability of other remedies does not resolve the issue of direct
causes of action under state constitutions. 3 4 A constitutional cause of
action must exist to enforce constitutional provisions and to correct
constitutional wrongs regardless of any legislative remedy.l 5 It is one
130. Id.
131 See Part V.A
132. See Rosen, 67 N.C. L. Rev. at 358 (cited in note 19) (noting, with respect to Bivens
suits, that "the Supreme Court has failed to explain adequately how a right derived directly from
the Constitution can be abrogated by an act of Congress"). In the federal arena, the absence of a
clear statement of the legal basis for constitutional tort claims has engendered much confusion.
See George D. Brown, Letting Statutory Tails Wag Constitutional Dogs-Have the Bivens
Dissenters Prevailed?," 64 hid. L. J. 263, 269-74 (1989) (discussing the confusion over the basis for
Bivens suits). This confusion, however, can and should be avoided in state courts. They should
firmly state that damages are a remedy for constitutional violations as a matter of constitutional
law. This is not to argue that legislatures may not impose additional liability for violations of
constitutional rights. These statutory enactments, however, should not supplant constitutional
remedies.
133. Widgeon, 479 A.2d at 928-29. See also Joan Steinman, Backing Off Bivens and the
Ramifications of this Retreat for the Vindication of First Amendment Rights, 83 Mich. L. Rev.
269, 282.85 (1984) (discussing the inadequacies of alternative remedies); Christina B. Whitman,
Emphasizing the Constitutional in Constitutional Torts, 72 Chi. Kent L. Rev. 661, 686 (1997) ("It
is dangerous to define constitutional claims as a narrow subset of tort law because tort law has
been particularly ineffective in dealing with precisely the sorts of interests and injuries that are
at the center of constitutional law.").
134. Widgeon, 479 A.2d at 929. See also Bandes, 68 S. Cal. L. Rev at 361 n.225 (cited in
note 15) (noting that courts make the ultimate determination about the effectiveness of
legislative remedies and have often exercised their power to supplement ineffective legislation in
the constitutional arena).
135. But see Kelley Property, 627 A.2d at 927 (Borden, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (noting that judicially created remedies for constitutional violations may be supplanted
by legislative enactments); Mindy L. McNew, Note, Moresi" Protecting Individual Rights
Through the Louisiana Constitution, 53 La. L. Rev. 1641, 1660 (1993) (arguing that statutes
granting fair and actual relief should suffice).
Alexander Hamilton recognized the necessity of remedies for constitutional violations. In
The Federalist No. 80 he wrote:
[Tihere ought always to be a constitutional method of giving efficacy to constitutional
provisions. What, for instance, would avail restridtions on the authority of the State leg-
islatures, without some constitutional mode of enforcing the observance of them?... No
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thing for a legislative remedy to exist, and another for that remedy to
meet constitutional minimums to ensure recovery.
5. Passing the Buck: The Requirement of Implementing Legislation
and the Refusal to Vindicate Constitutional Rights
Several courts have refused to recognize direct causes of action
for damages under state constitutions. They have based their deci-
sions on judicial incompetence or impropriety,136 a lack of historical or
common law foundation for these actions, 137 a conclusion that imple-
menting legislation is the only way to effectuate constitutional rights
in certain situations, 138 or on no expressed basis at all.13 9 These deci-
sions, however, cannot be reconciled with the traditional powers,
functions, and purposes of common law courts.
40
The Oregon Supreme Court addressed the concept of judicial
incompetence in Hunter v. City of Eugene.'4' The court was asked to
create a direct cause of action for violations of the rights to free
speech, liberty, and movement contained in the Oregon
Constitution.142 The court concluded that because there was no evi-
dence of intent to create a direct cause of action for damages, a consti-
man of sense will believe that such prohibitions would be scrupulously regarded without
some effectual power in the government to restrain or correct the infractions of them.
Federalist No. 80 (Hamilton), in Clinton Rossiter, ed., The Federalist Papers 475, 475-76 (Mentor,
1961).
136. Barcik v. Kubiaczyk, 321 Or. 174, 895 P.2d 765, 775 (1994) (en banc); Provens, 594
N.E.2d at 965; Hunter, 787 P.2d at 884; Vest, 757 P.2d at 598; 77th Dist. Judge, 438 N.W.2d at
339; Smith, 410 N.W.2d at 790 (Brickley, J., concurring).
137. Bouillion, 896 S.W.2d at 148; Cline v. Rogers, 87 F.3d 176, 179-80 (6th Cir. 1996);
Barcik, 895 P.2d at 775; Lee, 834 S.W.2d at 322; Hunter, 787 P.2d at 883; Bennett v. Home, 1989
WL 86555, 2 (Tenn. Ct. App.).
138. Barcik, 895 P.2d at 775; Hunter, 787 P.2d at 883; Tremblay v. Webster, 1996 WL
176381, 2 (Conn. Super. Ct.). But see Laguna Publishing Co., 182 Cal. Rptr. at 835; Fenton, 185
Cal. Rptr. at 762; Lloyd, 432 A.2d at 578.
139. Bagg v. University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston, 726 S.W.2d 582, 584 n.1 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1987). See also Czap v. Town of Newtown, 1996 WL 737486 (Conn. Super. Ct.)
(concluding that the Connecticut Supreme Court's decision in Kelley Property prohibits a consti-
tutional cause of action even in the absence of an alternative remedy).
140. See Part V-.
141. 309 Or. 298, 787 P.2d 881 (1990).
142. Id. at 882. The plaintiffs were a group of school teachers, accompanied by a news re-
porter, who were conducting a picket line at a high school. They alleged that they were attacked
by club.wielding police officers acting pursuant to directions from their supervisors. Further,
they alleged that any force inflicted was substantially above that necessary to accomplish any
legitimate law enforcement objective. Id.
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tutional tort claim could not succeed. 43 The court, however, further
claimed that it was not competent to make the necessary decisions
involving the creation of a new cause of action without legislative
guidance.'" The legislature would have to determine if any liability
existed.
Judicially created constitutional torts have also been rejected
because of an alleged lack of historical foundation. In City of
Beaumont v. Bouillion,45 the Supreme Court of Texas addressed the
issue of whether an action for damages would lie for a violation of the
rights of free speech and assembly contained in the Texas
Constitution.146 The court concluded that no implied cause of action
existed under the constitution4 7 and that the rights contained in the
constitution did not give rise to an actionable common law duty. 148
The court refused to create a new cause of action for such behavior. 49
The decisions of these courts are difficult to reconcile with a
common law court's inherent authority to create new causes of action
and remedies for wrongs.150 Further, any assertion that courts are not
competent to balance the concerns over constitutional liability is
completely inconsistent with the day-to-day decisions of common law
courts. Duty, proximate cause, and reasonable foreseeability, for
instance, are all concepts that these courts created to balance the need
for compensation with never-ending liability. 51 To assert that courts
143. Id. The court found no evidence of either "legislative intent!' or of textual and historical
support for such liability. Id.
144. Id. at 884. The court relied extensively on legislative intent because that is a necessary
element in implied causes of action for statutory violations. Nearing v. Weaver, 295 Or. 702, 670
P.2d 137, 143 (1983). This complete reliance on intent, however, is misplaced. See note 260. For
a further discussion of the competence of the judiciary in Bivens suits, see Brown, 64 Ind. L. J. at
278-85 (cited in note 132).
145. 896 S.W.2d 143 (Tex. 1995).
146. Id. at 144. The plaintiffs in Bouillion claimed constructive discharge from their
positions at the Beaumont Police Department. Id. They alleged that they were removed for
exercising their rights to free speech and free assembly in reporting official misconduct. Id.
147. Id. at 147.
148. Id. at 150. The court also reviewed common law causes of action for the violation of
constitutional rights. The court implicitly held that even though such actions existed at common
law, plaintiffs are bound by the traditional private law causes of action defined not by reference
to the values contained in the Texas Constitution but by other societal considerations. See id.
149. Id. This decision is strange when compared to Duty v. General Fin. Co., 154 Tex. 16,
273 S.W.2d 64 (1954) (recognizing the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress). In
Duty, the court asserted its common law power to create remedies for wrongs involving one's
common law right to be free from emotional distress but refused to assert this power when the
interest violated is a constitutional guarantee. Id. at 64-66.
150. See Part VA.
151. Bandes, 68 S. Cal. L. Rev. at 348 (cited in note 15) (noting that if courts are competent
to fashion such rules as causation then they are also competent to create constitutional torts);
Bivens, 403 U.S. at 403-04 (Harlan, J., concurring) (same).
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are incompetent to perform this function in the area of constitutional
rights is beyond understanding. 152 Asserting the court's incompetence
denies the strong remedial tradition in American tort law,153 refuses to
vindicate a right, and promotes a wrong of the highest magnitude. 154
III. THE LIABILITY OF STATE GOVERNMENTS FOR THE VIOLATION OF
STATE CONSTITUTIONS
Direct causes of action for violations of state constitutions
create a remedy of which many plaintiffs are deserving. Once consti-
tutional torts are recognized, though, courts must first determine who
should be liable and then construct a sound doctrinal and theoretical
foundation for that liability. This Part explores why constitutional
torts under state constitutions are necessary and why the state should
bare the brunt of that liability.
A. The Need for Government Liability
Traditional tort law recognizes damages as a remedy for the
violation of personal interests in order to affirm rights, provide com-
pensation, promote deterrence, vindicate rights, and provide corrective
justice.155  Government liability for constitutional tort violations
advances these goals. It forces the state to accept responsibility for
individuals the government places in positions of authority. Liability
deters future constitutional violations and also assuages the
traditional fears of overdeterrence from personal liability. It places
the burden of providing compensation on the party that can best
provide compensation and the party that can spread the costs
throughout the community: the government. Liability reinforces the
152. Compare Hunter, 787 P.2d at 884 (concluding that the Supreme Court of Oregon was
not competent to create a new cause of action involving constitutional violations) with Truman v.
Central Billing Bureau, Inc., 279 Or. 443, 568 P.2d 1382 (1977) (recognizing the tort of in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress). See also Nichol, 75 Va. L. Rev at 1132 (cited in note
92) ("Statements about lack of competence and 'legislative domain' are less powerful when used
to describe the traditional talent of courts to design remedies.").
153. David F. Partlett, Tort Liability and the American Way: Reflections on Liability for
Emotional Distress, 45 Am. J. Comp. L. 171, 184-87 (1997).
154. See Huckle, 95 Eng. Rep. at 769 ('They saw a magistrate over all the King's subjects,
exercising arbitrary power, violating Magna Charta, and attempting to destroy the liberty of the
kingdom...."); Wilkes, 98 Eng. Rep. at 490 ("That the constitution of our country had been so
fatally wounded, that it called aloud for the redress of a jury of Englishmen.").
155. W. Page Keeton, et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 4 at 20-26 (West, 5th ed. 1984).
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moral accountability of the state and vindicates the reliance interest of
the people. Finally, government liability holds the government
responsible as an agent of the people.
1. The Affirmation of the Plaintiffs Rights: A Remedy for
Every Wrong
A right without a remedy is not a right.156 The most basic and
logical rationale for the need of a remedy is the affirmation of the
plaintiffs rights. The plaintiff has suffered a legal wrong and needs
legal recognition of that wrong for no other reason than for society and
the wrongdoer to acknowledge the violation of law.
However, the affirmation of the plaintiffs rights does not re-
quire a damage award per se. Other remedies, such as injunctions,
criminal prosecution, professional and administrative discipline, and
civil penalties serve to affirm the existence of a right.157  Of these
alternatives, though, only injunctions may serve to affirm the
plaintiffs protected interest. In the case of a criminal prosecution and
civil penalties, it is actually the state that has been wronged. The
state seeks to have its interest in adherence to the penal code vindi-
cated, not the rights of the victim. Further, the prosecution of these
claims is completely within the state's discretion.'5
Although an injunction is a remedy that an aggrieved party
may request directly from a court, it often will not completely affirm
his rights. 59  An injunction requires that the plaintiff prove the
significant possibility of future harm. 60 This burden is quite difficult
for the plaintiff to meet with regard to personal rights and liberties
such as future intentional infliction of emotional distress. Many
constitutional violations occur because of the government's negligence.
How could a court enjoin future negligent acts? The plaintiff will also
fail to satisfy the burden in regard to random unconstitutional acts.
The remedy does not affirm the plaintiffs rights that have been
transgressed in the past but only serves to limit or restrict future
constitutional harm. In this respect, an injunction does not affirm the
rights of the victim.
156. See note 1.
157. John C. Jeffries, Jr., Compensation for Constitutional Torts: Reflections on the
Significance of Fault, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 82, 90 (1989).
158. Cooney, 792 P.2d at 1309 (Urbigkit, J., dissenting).
159. See note 81; Bott, 922 P.2d at 739.
160. Don B. Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 2.9(2) at 165-68 (West, 2d ed. 1993).
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Constitutional torts are the only conventional remedy in the
court's repertoire which can affirm the rights of the plaintiff. In an
action for damages, a court will have to address the alleged unconsti-
tutional behavior of the government and specifically affirm that right
with an award of damages. Indeed, the law of torts has long recog-
nized and endorsed this use of damages.161 Without a monetary
award, the violation of constitutional rights will remain effectively
ignored by the courts.
2. Assuring Effective and Actual Compensation
Compensation should make the plaintiff whole. 6 2 When an
individual's constitutional rights are violated, he is deserving of com-
pensatory damages for the loss he has suffered; otherwise, his consti-
tutional rights are meaningless. 63 Because a government official has
a much greater capacity to inflict harm than a private individual,
compensatory damages are even more appropriate for constitutional
torts.'6 Although the loss of one's right or of one's constitutionally
protected dignity is sometimes the only loss suffered by an
individual, 65 a compensatory scheme will ensure that that consti-
tutional loss will not go without relief.
Once it is determined, though, that compensation is needed,
the courts must decide who should bear the financial burden of provid-
ing compensation. Government liability is the natural choice because
it ensures effective compensation for the wronged plaintiff.166 Often,
judges and juries will be hesitant to hold a government agent
personally liable for an act taken in the scope of his employment
which is discovered later to have been unconstitutional. 6 7 Even if
161. See Part IA.
162. Jean C. Love, Presumed General Compensatory Damages in Constitutional Tort
Litigation: A Corrective Justice Perspective, 49 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 67, 68 n.4 (1992).
163. Kelley Property, 627 A.2d at 929 (Borden, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
164. Brown, 674 N.E.2d at 1140. See Whitman, 72 Chi. Kent L. Rev. at 669 (cited in note
133) (noting that constitutional torts stress "the special power of the government to do harm").
165. See Whitman, 72 Chi. Kent L. Rev. at 669 (cited in note 133) (noting that constitutional
torts seek to protect the dignity interests of individuals).
166. Michael Wells, The Past and the Future of Constitutional Torts: From Statutory
Interpretation to Common Law Rules, 19 Conn. L. Rev. 53, 77 (1986); William P. Kratzke, Some
Recommendations Concerning Tort Liability of Government and Its Employees for Torts and
Constitutional Torts, 9 Admin. L. J. Am. U. 1105, 1163 (1996).
167. Rosen, 67 N.C. L. Rev. at 346-47 (cited in note 19) (discussing the problems judges and
juries have with individual liability); Whitman, 79 Mich. L. Rev. at 56, 58 (cited in note 16) ("It is
easier, when the defendant is an institution rather than an individual, for court, parties, and
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liability is established, the amount of damages may well be insuffi-
cient to compensate for the actual loss suffered. 16
If, however, the government is the real party in interest, the
balance tips in favor of the plaintiff and the vindication of constitu-
tional rights. Judges and juries would be much more likely to hold the
government liable and to issue, an award reflective of the actual
wrong.169 Further, the government is in a much better position to en-
sure actual recovery because it is a "deep pocket" with the funds and
incentive to purchase insurance.
170
It has often been argued that sovereign immunity must exist
because compensatory damages awarded against the government will
deplete public resources.'7' Nevertheless, many governments already
indemnify their employees for any civil liability they incur in their
employment. 7 2 Second, the government is in the best position to
spread the costs of constitutional violations throughout the
community. 73 This cost spreading may provide further deterrence.
Because the public determines what assets are available, the public
may demand the replacement of government officials who squander
funds to pay constitutional tort awards. Thus, not only is the goal of
compensation better served through government liability, the goal of
deterrence is significantly advanced as well.
public to view the conflict as intergovernmental, and, where that is appropriate, to stress the
systemic origins of unconstitutional conduct.").
168. See Whitman, 72 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. at 669 (cited in note 133).
169. See Rosen, 67 N.C. L. Rev. at 346-47 (cited in note 19).
170. See Wells, 19 Conn. L. Rev. at 77 (cited in note 166).
171. See, for example, Montana v. Gilham, 932 F. Supp. 1215, 1219 (D. Mont. 1996); Payne
v. County of Jackson, 484 S.W.2d 483, 485-86 (Mo. 1972); Berek v. Metropolitan Dade County, 396
So. 2d 756, 758 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 895B (1979).
172. Brown, 674 N.E.2d at 1142 (discussing New York's indemnification statute); Meade,
647 A.2d at 834 (discussing the indemnification program in Baltimore). See, for example, Alaska
Stat. § 14.12.115 (1996); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 1-125 (West 1996); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 75-6116 (1995);
S.D. Cod. Laws Ann. § 3-22-1 (1996). See also John D. Kirby, Note, Qualified Immunity for Civil
Rights Violations: Refining the Standard, 75 Cornell L. Rev. 462, 485,88 (1990) (discussing
government indemnification programs and insurance); Neal Miller, Less-Than-Lethal Force
Weaponry: Law Enforcement and Correctional Agency Civil Law Liability for the Use of Excessive
Force, 28 Creighton L. Rev. 733, 749-50 (1995) (same); Peggy Ward Corn, Comment, Anderson v.
Creighton and Qualified Immunity, 50 Ohio St. L. J. 447, 463-68 (1989) (discussing the
advantages of a system of indemnification).
173. Wells, 19 Conn- L. Rev. at 76-77 (cited in note 166) (arguing that the government is in
the best position to spread costs); Kratzke, 9 Admin. L. J. Am. U. at 1165 (cited in note 166)
(same). Professor Whitman has also claimed that "[a] damage judgment against an entity
supported by public taxes leads to spreading, rather than mere shifting, of the costs of injuries."
Whitman, 79 Mich. L. Rev. at 67 (cited in note 16) (citation omitted). See also Kirby, 75 Cornell
L. Rev. at 490-91 (cited in note 172) (concluding that indemnification through insurance of
government agents allows for loss spreading).
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The threat of a financial burden should not discourage the
recognition of constitutional torts. Fear of depleting public assets
should not excuse the government's violation of the very document
that created it and defined its parameters. 174 This rationale only fur-
thers the undesired behavior.175 The enforcement of the government's
moral foundation and position in society, the need for effective gov-
ernment, and the shifting of loss away from the victim of unconstitu-
tional acts strongly support the conclusion that the government
should bear the burden of the unconstitutional conduct of its agents
even though this may tax the state's financial resources. It is this
economic pressure which creates the deterrent necessary to reduce
constitutional violations.
3. Deterrence of Constitutional Violations and the Avoidance
of Overdeterrence
Deterrence is a far more important objective with regard to
constitutional torts than with regard to traditional tort law176 because
the conduct is the very conduct that the founders sought to avoid.
177
Deterrence can be accomplished by liability and thereby induce consti-
tutionally appropriate behavior.7 8 The damage award punishes the
government through a transfer of funds and creates an incentive to
174. Professor Whitman argues, however, that the limited amount of public funds should be
used "to improve the conditions that caused the problems" instead of compensating plaintiffs for
past constitutional wrongs. Whitman, 79 Mich. L. Rev. at 50 (cited in note 16). This argument
fails to account for the actual unlimited funds that government possesses through its power to
tax and how voter backlash over increased taxation may be an effective deterrent in itself.
175. Justice Brandeis wrote about and explored the effects of government behavior:
Decency, security and liberty alike demand that government officials shall be subjected
to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen. In a government of laws,
existence of the government will be [imperiled] if it fails to observe the law scrupulously.
Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the
whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a law-
breaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it
invites anarchy.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
176. See Whitman, 79 Mich. L. Rev. at 55 (cited in note 16) ("We are more committed in
constitutional litigation than in a common-law tort litigation to the deterrence of certain conduct
and to using the skills of courts to articulate society's values.").
177. See Durant, 1997 WL 430992 at 11 (Any other remedy... would authorize the state to
violate constitutional mandates with little or no consequence."); Corum, 413 S.E.2d at 292
(noting that constitutional torts are necessary to deter violations of the North Carolina
Constitution because "that is the very harm that the people sought to thwart by adopting the
Declaration of Rights").
178. Wells, 19 Conn. L. Rev. at 71 (cited in note 166).
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prevent future violations. Unlike an injunction or other remedy,
damages are a tangible result which forces the government to transfer
funds from the public treasury to the private citizen, which in turn
requires either higher taxes or government cost-cutting. In the proc-
ess, the government, if held accountable through institutional liabil-
ity, would then take the necessary steps to reduce its liability by
selecting more competent employees, by providing them with better
and more continuous training, by ensuring more supervision of its
employees, and by creating internal disciplinary rules for violators of
the state constitution. 179 Constitutional torts are the best means of
deterring future unconstitutional acts.8 0
Government liability also avoids the problems associated with
overdeterring the conduct of government agents: As personal liability
is removed, agents will not be timid in performing their duties.
181
Government agents can perform their governmental duties knowing
that any constitutional infraction will be covered by their employer
179. See Part IILA.6.
180. Brown, 674 N.E.2d at 1144 ("A damage remedy for constitutional torts depriving
individuals of their liberty interests is the most effective means of deterring police misconduct, it
is appropriate to the wrong and it is consistent with the measure by which personal injuries have
historically been regulated."). See also Corum, 413 S.E.2d at 289 ("A direct cause of action
against the State for its violations of free speech is essential to the preservation of free speech.").
It has been claimed that damage awards are "time-consuming, wasteful, and painful for both
parties and the courts." Whitman, 79 Mich. L. Rev. at 60 (cited in note 16). Damage awards,
however, are designed to be painful for the parties, and they are certainly less painful for the
courts given the judicial oversight that injuctions require.
Professor Whitman has argued, however, that injunctions are the preferable remedy because
limited public funds should be used to correct the "systemic" problems which lead to
unconstitutional conduct of state agents. Id. Such an argument, however, fails to conform with
human norms. Until the government suffers an actual loss, it, like private citizens, will not take
the steps necessary to stop such losses in the future. Although, theoretically, it may be more
efficient to use injunctions and to apply government funds to better training and higher wages,
the likelihood that an effective program will be developed in such a situation is minimal. Indeed,
this runs contrary to the very notions developed over hundreds of years in tort law. Time has
proven that the most effective remedy, in the long run, is an award of damages. Further, any use
of pure equitable remedies may even create an incentive for protracted litigation and further
harm to the individual through burdensome litigation expenses. See Durant, 1997 WL 430992 at
13.
181. Wells, 19 Conn. L. Rev. at 80 (cited in note 166). It has been argued that damage
awards will "overdeter" and lead to the loss of effective, decisive, and beneficial government
conduct. Whitman, 79 Mich L. Rev. at 51 (cited in note 16); Wells, 19 Conn. L. Rev. at 72 (cited
in note 166). However, this argument is usually advanced in § 1983 cases where the officer is
held personally accountable, not the government. It loses much of its merit in a system of
government liability for individual actors who mistakenly or negligently violate a constitution
and will most likely only receive a light reprimand and further training. Thus, such an officer,
although hopefully more cognizant of the constitutional standards for his conduct, will not
behave in an overcautious way for he has little to lose.
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and not by their paycheck.1i 2 Although there is a general societal
interest to have effective and zealous government agents, innocent
plaintiffs should not have to absorb the costs of agents' lawlessness.183
4. Vindicating the Reliance Interest of the Citizenry and
the Rights of the People
A constitution is a social contract through which individuals
give up certain liberties.'84 In exchange, the government agrees to pro-
vide services for the community such as the enforcement of social
norms through the criminal law, the necessary infrastructure for the
economy, and a general system of social stability. 85 However, the
government also agrees to certain limitations on its authority in the
form of constitutional rights.1 The citizenry relies on the promise
that the government will respect certain areas when it grants
authority to the government.
187
Whenever the government breaches this contract, the govern-
ment has violated the community's reasonable reliance. The people
have relied to their detriment and deserve compensation. 188 Without
182. See Kelley Property, 627 A.2d at 923-24 (discussing the "chilling effect" of personal
liability); Whitman, 79 Mich. L. Rev. at 50 (cited in note 16) (concluding that personal liability
will deter conscientious persons from assuming public office); Wells, 19 Conn. L. Rev. at 80 (cited
in note 166) (concluding that "[g]overnment can mitigate or entirely eliminate the effect of
overdeterrence by indemnifying officers when they are held liable"); Kratzke, 9 Admin. L. J. Am.
U. at 1163 (cited in note 166) (concluding that personal "liability will also overdeter other
government employees").
183. Wells, 19 Conn. L. Rev. at 81 (cited in note 166) (noting that often the plaintiff is left
without any recovery for constitutional violations in order not to deter effective government and
concluding that the cost of such violations is more appropriately borne by the government).
184. Christensen v. State, 266 Ga. 474, 468 S.E.2d 188, 198 (1996) (Sears, J., dissenting);
United States v. Barona, 56 F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,
856 F.2d 1214, 1231 (9th Cir. 1988) (Wallace, J., dissenting); Cope v. Childers, 197 Okla. 176, 170
P.2d 210, 217 (1946) (Riley, J., dissenting). But see State v. Webb, 238 Conn. 389, 680 A.2d 147,
163 (1996).
185. See Moore v. Ganim, 233 Conn. 557, 660 A.2d 742, 762-63 (1995); Verdugo-Urquidez,
856 F.2d at 1232 (Wallace, J., dissenting); Reedy v. Mullins, 456 F. Supp. 955, 957 (W.D. Va.
1978).
186. See Moore, 660 A.2d at 762-63; Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1232 (Wallace, J.,
dissenting).
187. See Moore, 660 A.2d at 762-63; Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1232 (Wallace, J.,
dissenting); State v. Newton, 291 Or. 788, 636 P.2d 393, 405 (1981).
188. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90 (1981) demonstrates the pervasivenesss of
this concept in American law:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance
on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or for-
bearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The
remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires.
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relief, the foundation upon which the government is built falls into
question.
When a government violates a constitution, there is detri-
mental reliance-reliance by the people that the government will obey
the constitution and that the government will appropriately use the
power the people granted it. As a result, an injured citizen is uncer-
tain what to expect.189 A plaintiff is entitled not only to expect that the
government will live up to its own agreement but also that courts will
enforce the agreement and right the wrong. 19° Even though the gov-
ernment is often placed in a superior position with respect to the
private citizen in other contexts,' 9' this status cannot stand in the way
of vindicating a violation of the constitution. Courts must recognize
the need to hold the government accountable in the face of the commu-
nity's reliance on its agreement with the government. 92 Without such
recognition, no true limitations on government exist.
5. Corrective Justice
Corrective justice is a concept born in the mind of Aristotle.
9 3
Aristotle viewed the relationship between wrongdoer and victim as
one which, at its most basic level, demanded damages in order to cor-
rect the balance. 94 The theory developed by the Greek philosopher
Although this provision arguably only advocates the limited damages usually awarded in con-
tract claims, it is still a useful example of the importance of reliance and the need to compensate
for it.
189. Paul Finn and Kathryn J. Smith, The Citizen, the Government, and 'Reasonable
Expectations," 66 Austl. L. J. 139, 140 (1992); Kelley Property, 627 A.2d at 928 (Berdon, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ('fVe do have the right, however, to expect that [public
officials] will not use their positions of authority--even if unpaid and difficult, as are the
positions of the defendants in this case-to work against us for malicious motives.").
190. Finn and Smith, 66 Austl. L. J. at 140 (cited in note 189).
191. Professors Finn and Smith recently noted this comparison of equities:
[Tihe expectation the individual citizen can have of fair treatment at the hands of gov-
ernment or, for that matter of public authorities, is still significantly circumscribed by
the advantageous position in which both government and public authorities are often
placed through doctrines, reserved to them alone, which allow individual interest to be
sacrificed to consideration of public welfare.
Id. at 144.
192. See Corum, 413 S.E.2d at 292 ("Indeed, that is the very harm that the people sought to
thwart by adopting the Declaration of Rights. In a democratic society legal doctrine should be
designed so as to accentuate, not diminish, public accountability of government for its actions.").
193. Jeffries, 88 Mich. L. Rev. at 93 (cited in note 157) (citing Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics
§§ 1130a-32b); Kathryn R. Heidt, Corrective Justice from Aristotle to Second Order Liability:
Who Should Pay When the Culpable Cannot?, 47 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 347, 349 (1990).
194. Jeffries, 88 Mich. L. Rev. at 93 (cited in note 157); Heidt, 47 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. at
354-55 (cited in note 193) (noting that corrective justice "restorles] the parties to the position the
parties occupied prior to the transaction"); Kent Roach, The Limits of Corrective Justice and the
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requires the award of monetary compensation whenever one party
ignores the limitations placed upon its behavior with respect to an-
other party.195
When the government engages in unconstitutional acts, it is
overstepping its limitations. The plaintiff suffers a loss while the
state may realize gains through more efficient implementation of a
government policy or program.'9 The transfer of funds from the
wrongdoer to the victim rectifies the loss and returns the ill-gotten
gains, restoring the balance between the parties. Because of the
nature of the concept, immunity cannot stand in the way of correcting
a wrong. Thus, when immunity and corrective justice conflict, it is the
need to correct the prior unconstitutional act which must prevail. 91
Unlike traditional tort law, the constitutional tort doctrine does not
reduce constitutional violations to an economic status so that the state
government may achieve some optimal number of constitutional
breaches. 98 Rather, the doctrine employs traditional notions of cor-
rective justice.'9 Thus, "[i]f a plaintiff has a right, he must of neces-
sity have a means to vindicate and maintain it, and a remedy if he is
injured in the exercise or enjoyment of it .... "200 To this end, it is
irrelevant whether the harm suffered can be expressed in economic
terms, for it is not the harm for which the plaintiff is compensated, but
the breach itself.20' Although other remedies may also vindicate
constitutional rights, 20 2 damages promise to be the most effective. 203
Potential of Equity in Constitutional Remedies, 33 Ariz. L. Rev. 859, 867 (1991) (discussing
Aristotle's view of corrective justice).
195. "Mhe principle of corrective justice requires that the responsible party pay damages in
order to vindicate those rights." Wells, 19 Conn. L. Rev. at 80 (cited in note 166).
196. Jefrxies, 88 Mich. L. Rev. at 94 (cited in note 157).
197. Wells, 19 Conn. L. Rev. at 80 (cited in note 166).
198. Id. at 72.
199. Id. at 72-73.
200. Ashby, 92 Eng. Rep. at 136 (Holt, C.J., dissenting).
201. See Whitman, 72 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. at 669 (cited in note 133) (noting that constitutional
torts seek to "protect the dignity interest of the person of the plaintiff by specifying limits on the
defendant's potentially intrusive conduct") (emphasis added).
202. Professor Whitman has written:
[A] damage award is not needed to emphasize the existence or importance of the plain-
tiffs right. Damages serve only as a formal token of the legal conclusion of the court.
Equity can do the job just as well, for a declaration is all that is necessary....
Whitman, 79 Mich. L. Rev. at 53 (cited in note 16). Such a conclusion, however, fails to take into
account the actual and symbolic importance of money in contemporary American society. If
equity were truly a sufficient remedy in the eyes of plaintiffs, they would request an equitable
remedy from the court. In private torts, plaintiffs often bring actions against others requesting a
minuscule amount of compensatory damages or simply nominal damages. They do not seek an
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6. The Responsibility of the Government as
Principal and Employer
Because governments choose their agents and place them
where the agents can commit constitutional infractions, the
government should be held financially responsible.204 Since the
government selects its own agents, trains them, and oversees their
employment, the government is in the best position to institute the
programs necessary to eradicate constitutional violations. 20 5 Because
most constitutional violations are attributable to systemic flaws in
state government, the state should face liability in order to facilitate
correction of those flaws.206 By selecting the best employees, by
providing them with adequate and continued training, and by dis-
ciplining them for their unconstitutional behavior, the government
can substantially reduce the number of constitutional torts. 27
injunction because it does not carry the symbolic message of a damage award and the forced
transfer of property.
203. The award of damages is "necessary and appropriate to ensure the full realization of
the rights" contained in state constitutions. Brown, 674 N.E.2d at 1139. Constitutional torts
provide the means to assert those rights against the intrusions of the government.
204. Whitman, 79 Mich. L. Rev. at 56 (cited in note 16) ("[S]uch [damage] awards imply a
culpability that is not appropriately placed upon an individual defendant who in effect serves
only as a stand-in for a state or local government."); Christina B. Whitman, Government
Responsibility for Constitutional Torts, 85 Mich. L. Rev. 225, 227-30 (1986) (discussing the role
responsibility plays in assigning liability).
205. Wells, 19 Conn. L. Rev. at 77 (cited in note 166). Professor Whitman has also written
that "[m]any of [a government agent's mistakes] may be caused by forces for which he cannot be
held personally accountable-lack of education, training, personnel and equipment; and absence
of public support" Whitman, 79 Mch. L. Rev. at 60 (cited in note 16). See also Kratzke, 9
Admin. L. J. Am. U. at 1162 n.354 (cited in note 166). Thus, government liability is far more
appropriate. But see Smith, 410 N.W.2d at 789 (stating that "making governmental bodies, as
opposed to individual officials, liable for damages for constitutional violations lessens the
deterrent effect of a Bivens-style remedy").
206. Whitman, 79 Mich. L. Rev. at 57 (cited in note 16). See also Laura Oren, Immunity
and Accountability in Civil Rights Litigation: Who Should Pay?, 50 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 935, 1003
(1989) (concluding that "[i]t is the government, and not the individual employee, which has the
ability to change policy, discipline misconduct, and require a different kind of training"); Jeremy
Travis, Note, Rethinking Sovereign Immunity After Bivens, 57 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 597, 636-37 (1982)
("By holding governments liable for the effects of policies they promulgate, courts focus attention
on purposeful activity [which] is precisely the type of decisionmaking process in which
contemplation of potential damage liability is most likely to tip the balance in favor of observance
of constitutional values").
207. Professor Schuck discussed this rationale and provided an effective illustration.
Consider a damage judgment against a city resulting from an illegal arrest by a police of-
ficer. The police department can respond by ordering additional training, new arrest
guidelines, more and closer supervision, different recruitment and promotion policies, in-
ternal discipline, and the like. It may conclude instead that the benefits of illegal arrests
outweigh the costs of anticipated adverse judgments or that, in any event, it can protect
its budget from being taxed with those costs. In either case, the police department might
decide to seek changes in the law or confine such arrests to situations in which com-
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Further, it is inconsistent that the government may be liable for the
common law torts of its employees but not their constitutional
misconduct.2°6 Finally, if individual agents remain personally liable
for their unconstitutional behavior and governments for theirs, it will
become difficult to determine which party is the appropriate
defendant in any given suit.2°9
B. The Rejection of Sovereign Immunity
In the realm of constitutional torts, the doctrine of sovereign
immunity cannot be permitted to protect the government.210 The
doctrine is incompatible with the concept of constitutional rights, 211 for
constitutional rights are specifically designed to limit the actions of
the government and its agents.212 When state actors go beyond the
constitutionally permissible scope of their authority, the state must be
held accountable. 213
plaints by suspects are least likely. Alternatively, it might issue a warning to officers but
take no steps to enforce it.
Schuck, Suing Government at 18 (cited in note 20). It is important to recognize that even though
the government may be liable, it may simply pay any necessary damage awards and continue to
behave unconstitutionally. This potential, however, should not be used to defeat government
liability, for this potential inheresin the basic concepts behind tort liability. Tortfeasors who are
willing to pay may commit torts. Further, though, this outcome fails to take into consideration
the deterrent effect such awards may have over time. See Part I1A3.
208. Brown, 674 N.E.2d at 1142.
209. Whitman, 85 Mich. L. at 248-60, 276 (cited in note 204) (discussing the means courts
use and the difficulty in determining whether the government or the individual should be liable
for a constitutional tort and advancing "[a] shift in focus beyond questions of individual
wrongdoing").
210. Bandes, 68 S. Cal. L. Rev. at 343 (cited in note 15) ("Sovereign immunity need not, and
should not, pose an obstacle to governmental accountability.").
211. See Travis, 57 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 602-04 (cited in note 206) (discussing the
inconsistencies of sovereign immunity and constitutional rights including the ability to enjoin
prospective violations but not to recover compensation for past injuries). The Utah Supreme
Court has recently held that "[c]onstitutional rights serve to restrict governmental conduct.
These rights would never serve this purpose if the state could use governmental immunity to
avoid constitutional liability." Bott, 922 P.2d at 736-37. Thus, constitutional rights can only be
truly advanced and enforced if sovereign immunity is removed as an obstacle. See also Cooney,
792 P.2d at 1318 (Urbigkit, J., dissenting) ("Governmental immunity or public officer privilege
rests on a faulty and fallacious conceptual justification as only recently growing like thistles on
the American governmental and judicial landscape.").
212. Brown, 674 N.E.2d at 1140; Corum, 413 S.E.2d at 292; Michael Wells, Constitutional
Torts, Common Law Torts, and Due Process of Law, 72 Chi. Kent L. Rev. 617, 636 (1997).
213. See Strauss, 330 A.2d at 650 (holding the state liable because the state "through its
agents and employees" violated the rights of the plaintiff). But see Rockhouse Mountain Prop.
Owners, 503 A.2d at 1390 (refusing to determine "whether a municipality should be bound under
respondeat superior, or whether something more should be required before the municipality
would also'be liable in damages").
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Courts should recognize the threat of sovereign immunity and
declare the doctrine inapplicable to constitutional tort actions.214 This
abrogation should extend not only to common law sovereign immunity
but also to statutory immunity. Legislatures should not define the
scope of recovery or liability for constitutional matters.215 Removing
this burden on plaintiffs is clearly within the power of the courts216
and arguably is a dictate of state constitutions.'
7
Sovereign immunity is misplaced in American jurisprudence 2 8
in which no one, not even the government, should be above the law.219
214. See Cooney, 792 P.2d at 1318-21 (Urbigkit, J., dissenting) (listing cases and authorities
criticizing the doctrine of sovereign immunity).
215. See notes 132-35 and accompanying text. But see Jennifer Friesen, Recovering
Damages for State Bills of Rights Claims, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1269, 1298 (1985) (advocating that
legislatures have the power to create sovereign immunity for constitutional tort claims but that
legislatures should specifically abrogate and abolish the immunity).
The doctrine of sovereign immunity did not enter the English common law until 1788.
Corum, 413 S.E.2d at 291. Thus, the doctrine did not come into existence in England until after
the American Revolution. As such, it is not a command of the original common law of the
colonies. In fact, it did not take root in the United States until the late 19th century. See id.
(discussing the history of sovereign immunity in North Carolina). Because it is not a concept
that existed when most state constitutions were first promulgated, state courts should have no
problem reaching the conclusion that the doctrine is not part of the constitutional common law
but a concept that developed many years later.
216. Bandes, 68 S. Cal. L. Rev. at 343, 346 (cited in note 15). See also Friesen, 63 Tex. L.
Rev. at 1296 (cited in note 215). But see Vest, 757 P.2d at 598 n.40 (concluding that the
constitutional command that the legislature determine when the state is amenable to suit might
prohibit the recognition of constitutional torts against the state).
The "remedies" clauses of state constitutions may also grant the courts authority to abrogate
sovereign immunity. See Friesen, 63 Tex. L. Rev. at 1296-99 (cited in note 215). See also Bott,
922 P.2d at 736-37 (concluding that the Unnecessary Rigor Clause of the Utah Constitution
prohibits any form of sovereign immunity in constitutional tort claims). However, if the
immunity is actually a commandment of the constitutional text, courts may not be able to hold
the state liable. See Bontwell, 486 S.E.2d at 921-22 (discussing the sovereign immunity created
by the Georgia Constitution).
217. The Utah Supreme Court has recently concluded that statutorily imposed immunity
violates the state constitution. Bott, 922 P.2d at 736-37. The court held that any statute which
takes away or impairs a constitutional right is beyond the province of the legislature. Id. (citing
Thomas M. Cooley, 2 Constitutional Limitations 756 (Little, Brown, 1927)). Because the
immunity impaired recovery which would otherwise have been allowed, the immunity was
repugnant to the Utah Constitution and could not stand as a barrier to the constitutional tort
claim. Id. See also Kenneth Davis, 5 Administrative Law Treatise 55 (Little, Brown, 2d ed.
1984); Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction § 9.1.4 at 539-40 (cited in note 3). But see Bontwell,
486 S.E.2d at 921-22 (discussing the sovereign immunity contained in the Georgia Constitution).
218. Professor Borchard concluded that the development of sovereign immunity in the
United States cannot be sufficiently explained:
Nothing seems more clear than that this immunity of the King from the jurisdiction of
the King's court was purely personal. How it came to be applied in the United States of
America, where the prerogative is unknown, is one of the mysteries of legal evolution.
Edwin M. Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 Yale L. J. 1, 4 (1924). But see Harold J.
Krent, Reconceptualizing Sovereign Immunity, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 1529, 1530-32 (1992) (arguing
that sovereign immunity "comports with our constitutional fabric" creating "structural protection
for democratic rule").
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The doctrine is premised on the belief that the king can do no wrong.
However, the king commits many wrongs.20 The doctrine of sovereign
immunity was rejected by many early state courts221 and should
continue to be rejected by modern state courts.222  Sovereignty
originates with the people, and the government must be held
accountable to them.2 3 As President Abraham Lincoln noted, "[i]t
is... as much the duty of Government to render prompt justice
against itself in favor of citizens as it is to administer the same be-
tween private individuals."224
C. The Basis for State Liability
Beyond the issue of sovereign immunity, courts must develop a
construct to determine when the government is to be liable. Two
options have emerged in the case law: liability based upon actions
taken pursuant to a custom or policy of the government 225 and liability
determined by the law of agency and respondeat superior.226 Although
the requirement of a custom or policy will ensure the vindication of
constitutional rights violated in accordance therewith, it leaves many
plaintiffs with remedies only against governmental officers in their
individual capacity. This requirement does not hold the government
accountable for other unconstitutional acts for which it is often just as
219. Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction § 9.2.1 at 547 (cited in note 3).
220. See Bandes, 68 S. Cal. L. Rev. at 344 (cited in note 15) ("The principle that the King
was capable of doing wrong and should be held accountable for it was the premise of the Magna
Carta.").
221. See Corum, 413 S.E.2d at 291 (discussing four North Carolina decisions rejecting the
doctrine). See also Travis, 57 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 604-17 (cited in note 206) (discussing the roots of
sovereign immunity in common law England, its early rejection in the United States, and the
eventual development of the doctrine in America).
222. Sovereign immunity has "'no foundation in public justice or convenience,' and any
person should be entitled to make 'any just claim or demand against the Government'" stem-
ming from constitutional violations. Finn and Smith, 66 Austl. L. J. at 139 (cited in note 189)
(citation omitted).
223. See Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State
Sovereign Immunity, 98 Yale L. J. 1, 80 (1988) ("[Ihe common law doctrine was founded on a
notion that sovereignty resides in the person of the monarch, whereas the premise of the
Constitution was that sovereignty derived from the people and the government created under the
Constitution was subject to that written law."). Indeed, the notion that the state government is
accountable to the people is contained in many state constitutions.
224. Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction § 9.2.1 at 546 (cited in note 3).
225. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 633 (1980); Monell v. Department of
Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1987); Smith, 410 N.W.2d at 794.
226. Brown, 674 N.E.2d at 1142 (imposing vicarious liability on the state of New York);
Vernado v. Department of Employment and Training, 1996 WL 773181, 5 (La. Ct. App.) (stating
that vicarious liability should be used to determine the liability of the government).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:1525
morally responsible as if the acts had been taken pursuant to a custom
or policy.2
27
Complete reliance on respondeat superior also creates some
problems as many state actors, especially those elected to their posi-
tions, often do not meet the requirements of a servant necessary for
vicarious liability to attach.22 Thus, a plaintiff may be able to recover
from the government for the acts of its employees but not for the
misdeeds of an elected official.229 Because both doctrines leave the
government free from liability in various situations, courts must
create a new doctrine to ensure full compensation and vindication, as
well as to ensure governmental accountability for government actors.
Government officials, as individual actors, cannot truly commit
a constitutional tort because only state actors can violate
constitutional provisions.23 0 It is a fallacy to hold government officials
individually liable for constitutional torts since they could not have
227. See Brown, 674 N.E.2d at 1142 (rejecting the Supreme Court's limitations of
government liability because "the State is appropriately held answerable"); Whitman, 79 Mich. L.
Rev. at 58 n.258 (cited in note 16) (noting that the use of the custom or policy model will be
unlikely to encompass all systemic flaws giving rise to constitutional violations).
228. See, for example, Moy v. County of Cook, 159 Ill. 2d 519, 640 N.E.2d 926, 928 (1994)
(concluding that respondeat superior could not be used to impose liability on a county for the
negligent acts of the county sheriff, because, among other reasons, he was an elected official).
229. Respondeat superior in its traditional form actually is not the best solution because it
requires control or the right of control over the employee. See, for example, Kidder v. Miller
Davis Co., 1997 WL 374043 (Mich.) (noting the use of the control test to impose respondeat
superior liability); Hooper v. Browner, 148 Md. 417, 129 A. 672, 676 (1925) (concluding that
respondeat superior rests on the power of control of superior over the subordinate); Harold G.
Reuschlein and William A. Gregory, The Law of Agency and Partnership § 52 at 104 (West, 2d ed.
1990) (noting that respondeat superior liability derives from a master's right of control over his
servants). Consequently, many government officials may not be found to be servants for the
purpose of the master and servant relationship. Thus, although an elected, independent county
sheriff may not meet the requirements of respondeat superior, he is still in the position to violate
the state constitution.
In order to ensure compensation in this situation, liability should be imputed to the govern-
ment regardless of whether or not the relationship meets the formal requirements of respondeat
superior. Although it can be argued that in such a case there is no deterrent effect because the
elected official is not truly subject to the control of the sovereign, he is, however, subject to the
will of the voters. The deterrent lies in his desire to be reelected and continue his employment.
Thus, he has an automatic incentive, outside the realm of personal liability, to keep his
constitutional infractions to a minimum. See also Cashen v. Spann, 125 N.J. Super. 386, 311
A.2d 192, 202 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 1973) (holding that a county was not vicariously liable for
the action of a prosecutor because he was an agent of the state, but passing on whether the
county could ever be liable for the actions of the defendants).
230. Corum, 413 S.E.2d at 292-93. However, in Melbourne Corp., 394 N.E.2d at 1291, the
court stated:
The City is a municipal corporation that can function only through the actions of its
agents and officials. Melbourne may not evade the effects of the [Illinois Tort Claims]
Act by suing the City itself, but not the Board officials whose actions or omissions consti-
tuted the alleged cause of action. The City may properly invoke the Board's immunity.
Id. at 1298.
1562
1997] CONSTITUTIONAL TORT ACTIONS 1563
committed the constitutional violation but for their status as state
actors.231 Thus, the actual violation of the constitution has been
perpetrated not by the individual agent but by the government acting
through the agent. This relationship is a form of inherent agency
power that imputes liability to the government.23 2 Just as an agent
who has the inherent power to make true statements also has the
inherent power to make misrepresentations,233 a government official
who is bound by the constitution also has the power to violate the
constitution. Since this power inheres in the agency relationship, the
principal should be held liable, even if the agent acts contrary to the
principal's express instructions.234 Thus, the government should be
held accountable for damages arising from the unconstitutional acts of
any member of the government, whether the actual tortfeasor is a
legislator, an elected member of the executive, or any other govern-
ment official or agent.
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS
Once constitutional torts for violations of state constitutions
are recognized, there are many implications beyond the affirmation of
the plaintiffs rights and the subsequent compensation for the viola-
tion of those rights. These torts provide many unique benefits for
231. Brown, 674 N.E.2d at 1142-43.
232. The Restatement (Second) of Agency defines inherent agency powers as "a term
used ... to indicate the power of an agent which is derived not from authority, apparent
authority or estoppel, but solely from the agency relationship and exists for the protection of
persons harmed by or dealing with a servant or other agent." Restatement (Second) of Agency
§ 8A (1958).
233. See, for example, Outlaw v. McMichael, 397 So. 2d 1009, 1010 (Fla. App. 1981).
234. Of course, for the government to be liable for acts committed outside the scope of the
agent's authority, the plaintiff must have reasonably relied on the status of the agent. See
Bernstein v. Centaur Ins. Co., 644 F. Supp. 1361, 1369 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). The concept of reason-
ableness, though, should go to the issue of authority, not to the conduct itself. Thus, if an agent
asserts that he works for the government or is acting pursuant to government authority, this
should satisfy the requirement. It should be immaterial if the action taken by the agent, such as
a blatant use of unnecessary and unreasonable force, is itself unreasonable. The reliance stems
from the manifestations of the agent based upon the authority that the principal has vested in
him. See William R. Turner Co. v. WIO0, Inc., 528 F.2d 262, 268 (3rd Cir. 1975). Further,
private citizens should not be expected to question or second guess the commands of government
officials. This can often lead to criminal liability. For instance, a citizen may not resist arrest
even if the individual believes the arrest to be in violation of the state constitution. See, for
example, State v. Valentine, 132 Wash. 2d 1, 935 P.2d 1294, 1303 (1997) (holding that an
individual may not use force to resist an illegal arrest); State v. Laughlin, 933 P.2d 813, 815
(Mont. 1997) (same). Thus, it should be deemed reasonable for a private citizen to succumb to
the dictates of a government official.
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citizens and even for state governments ranging from greater
structural protections to the opportunity to develop constitutional law.
A. Unprotected Rights: The Rejection of the U.S. Supreme Court's
Interpretation of the Bill of Rights
State constitutions guaranteed individual rights prior to the
enactment of the federal Bill of Rights.235  As a result, the federal
version was premised on the rights contained in the state
constitutions of the day.23 6  Further exemplifying the importance of
state bills of rights, some states modeled their constitutional
guarantees primarily on previous state constitutions, not on the rights
expressed in the federal Constitution.237
Although states had long been the protectors of individual
liberties, 238 they lost this role during the the Warren Court era.2 9 In
the last two decades, however, state courts have seen a dramatic shift
in the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Bill of
Rights such that its protections are constantly being reduced.
240
Consequently, states are turning to their own constitutions to protect
their citizenry.241 This use of state constitutions is unquestionably
235. Hans A. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States'Bills of Rights, 9 U. Balt.
L. Rev. 379, 380-81 (1980).
236. "Prior to the adoption of the federal Constitution, each of the rights eventually recog-
nized in the federal Bill of Rights had previously been protected in one or more state constitu-
tions." Brennan, 90 Harv. L. Rev. at 501 (cited in note 80) (footnote omitted). See also Judith S.
Kaye, Forward: The Common Law and State Constitutional Law as Full Partners in the
Protection of Individual Rights, 23 Rutgers L. J. 727, 732 (1992).
237. See, for example, Linde, 9 U. Balt. L. Rev. at 381 (cited in note 235) ("For example,
Oregon's constitution adopted Indiana's copy of Ohio's version of sources found in Delaware and
elsewhere.").
238. Brennan, 90 Harv. L. Rev. at 502 (cited in note 80).
239. Developments in the Law-The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 Harv.
L. Rev. 1367, 1368 (1982) ("Throughout the Warren Court years, the availability of independent
state constitutional interpretation was of little importance:).
240. Brennan, 90 Harv. L. Rev. at 495-98 (cited in note 80) (discussing Supreme Court
decisions finding no constitutional violations); William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the
States: The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
535, 547-48 (1986) (same); Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., More on the New Federalism in Criminal
Procedure, 63 Ky. L. J. 873, 873-75 (1975) (same).
241. Paul S. Hudnut, State Constitutions and Individual Rights: The Case for Judicial
Restraint, 63 Denver U. L. Rev. 85, 87 (1985). See generally, Wayne R. LaFave and Jerold H.
Israel, Criminal Procedure § 2.10 at 93-95 (West, 2nd ed. 1992). Justice Brennan has noted this
phenomenon and has enthusiastically endorsed it:
State constitutions, too, are a font of individual liberties, their protections often extend-
ing beyond those required by the Supreme Court's interpretation of federal law. The le-
gal revolution which has brought federal law to the fore must not be allowed to inhibit
the independent protective force of state law-for without it, the full realization of our
liberties cannot be guaranteed.
1564
19971 CONSTITUTIONAL TORT ACTIONS 1565
permissible as states may grant greater protections than the federal
constitution, 242 and states should embrace this use as the federal
government continues to shift the responsibility for government to
them.24
3
Refusing to apply the Supreme Court's interpretation of a
constitutional right to the state constitution often leaves an individual
without a mechanigm to enforce that right. Federal rights are
enforced via 42 U.S.C. § 1983.24 This statute, however, only reaches
federal constitutional and statutory rights.245 This limitation creates
no problem regarding those provisions of state constitutions which
state courts interpret identically to the provisions' federal
counterparts. But when state courts choose to grant greater
protections, a state law action for damages must be found in order to
compensate for any violation and to vindicate the state right.246 Thus,
an ever increasing need exists for the recognition of direct causes of
action under state constitutions.
247
Brennan, 90 Harv. L. Rev. at 491 (cited in note 80).
Justice Brennan noted that between 1970 and 1984, state courts had concluded in over 250
published opinions that the respective state constitution contained more stringent constraints on
the government than the federal counterpart as interpreted by the Supreme Court. Brennan, 61
N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 548 (cited in note 240). In a recent survey, Professor Latzer found that during
the period from the late 1960s through 1989, one state decision in three rejected the
interpretations of the United States Supreme Court on state constitutional law grounds. Barry
Latzer, The Hidden Conservatism of the State Court 'Revolution" 74 Judicature 190, 190 (1991).
242. Brennan, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 548 (cited in note 240) ("As is well known, federal pres-
ervation of civil liberties is a minimum, which the states may surpass so long as there is no clash
with federal law."); Linde, 9 U. Balt. L. Rev. at 383 (cited in note 235); Cooney, 792 P.2d at 1325
(Urbigkit, J., dissenting) ("It is neither novel nor new in this era for recognition to be afforded
that state courts provide greater protection for constitutional rights of citizens than can be
expected or is provided by the federal authority.").
243. See Saldana v. State, 846 P.2d 604, 646 (Wyo. 1993) (Urbigkit, J., dissenting) (quoting
Timothy Stallcup, Comment, The Arizona Constitutional 'ight to Privacy" and the Invasion of
Privacy Tort, 24 Ariz. St. L. J. 687, 693-95 (1992)).
244. See note 3.
245. See note 5 and accompanying text.
246. See Brown, 674 N.E.2d at 1141 ("By recognizing a narrow remedy for violations of
Sections 11 and 12 of the State Constitution, we provide appropriate protection against official
misconduct at the State level.").
247. In addition to the greater protections often afforded under state constitutions, many
contain rights and provisions which have no counterpart in the Federal Constitution. See, for
example, Alaska Const., Art. 1, § 24 (providing for victims' rights); Ariz. Const., Art. 2, § 2.1
(declaring a "Victims' Bill of Rights"); Del. Const., Art. 1, § 14 ("No commission of oyer and
terminer, or jail delivery, shall be issued."); Ga. Const., Art. 1, § 1, Par. XXI ("Neither banish-
ment beyond the limits of the state nor whipping shall be allowed as a punishment for crime.");
Ga. Const., Art. 1, § 1, Par. XXV ("The social status of a citizen shall never be the subject of
legislation."); Ga. Const., Art. I, § 22 (enumerating the rights of crime victims); Md. Const., Decl.
of Rights, Art. 19 ("That every man, for any injury done to him in his person or property, ought to
have remedy by the course of the Law of the land...."); Mich. Const., Art. 1, § 17 ("The right of
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B. The Development of Constitutional Protections in
Non-Criminal Cases
State courts should reject any requirement that a right be
clearly established before civil liability attaches for its violation.248
State courts will then have a greater opportunity to develop their own
all individuals, firms, corporations and voluntary associations to fair and just treatment in the
course of legislative and executive investigations and hearings shall not be infringed."); Mo.
Const., Art. 1, § 29 ("[E]mployees shall have the right to organize and to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing."); Mont. Const., Art II, § 4 ("Neither the state nor
any person, firm, corporation, or institution shall discriminate against any person in the exercise
of his civil or political rights on account of race, color, sex, culture, social origin or condition, or
political or religious ideas."); N.H. Const., Pt. 1, Art. 21 (right to compensation for jurors).
248. Only one state supreme court has specifically addressed qualified immunity as a means
to defeat personal liability. In Moresi v. State, the Supreme Court of Louisiana found this
defense appropriate. Moresi, 567 So. 2d at 1081. Following federal precedent, the court held
that "[i]f the defendant shows that the state constitutional right alleged to have been violated
was not clearly established, the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity." Id. at 1094. The
court then addressed the difficulty associated with determining when a right is clearly
established. Id. After reviewing its precedents with respect to the constitutional provision at is-
sue, the court held that the officers would have had no reasonable basis to believe that their
conduct would violate the Louisiana Constitution. Id.
For qualified immunity to attach, a government official must show that the alleged right
violated was not clearly established. But as personal liability is replaced with sovereign liability,
the doctrine of qualified immunity becomes inapplicable. Thus, any requirement that a right be
clearly established should also be discarded for several reasons.
First the determination of when a right is clearly established is quite difficult. Kathryn R.
Urbonya, Problematic Standards of Reasonableness: Qualified Immunity in Section 1983 Actions
for a Police Officer's Use of Excessive Force, 62 Temp. L. Rev. 61, 79-81 & nn.134-37 (1989)
(discussing the difficulties in determining when a right is clearly established); Chemerinsky,
Federal Jurisdiction § 8.6 at 479-80 (cited in note 3) (discussing the unsettled nature of what
constitutes a clearly established right). See also A. Allise Burris, Note, Qualifying Immunity in
Section 1983 & Bivens Actions, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 123, 163-65 (1992) (arguing that qualified
immunity "approximates absolute immunity" because of the difficulty of overcoming the clearly
established right requirements). Must there be a direct case on point from the court of last
resort in jurisdiction? Do only a few courts of appeals in the state need to recognize the right?
Second, it is inherently improper to deny a plaintiff compensation simply because not enough
courts have addressed the existence of the right which the plaintiff alleges to have been violated.
Bott, 922 P.2d at 737; Kewin v. Board of Educ., 65 Mich. App. 472, 237 N.W.2d 514, 520 (1975)
("Even though the constitutional claim may be one of first impression, courts should award
compensation where there is an infringement of personal interests in liberty."); Cooney, 792 P.2d
at 1332 (Urbigkit, J., dissenting) (same). But see Marlin v. City of Detroit, 205 Mich. App. 335,
517 N.W.2d 305, 308 (1994) ([W]e conclude that the lack of 'clarity of the constitutional
protection violated' in this case would militate against a judicially inferred damage remedy.")
(citing Smith, 410 N.W.2d at 749); Melbourne Corp., 394 N.E.2d at 225 ("That Melbourne's
constitutional rights were being violated was not 'clearly' established until the decision of our
Supreme Court and then only by a four to three margin... ).
Plaintiffs often care most about vindicating those rights which have yet to be acknowledged
by the courts. Whitman, 79 Mich. L. Rev. at 52 (cited in note 16). Thus, the rejection of the
clearly established right requirement will remove some of the difficulty from constitutional tort
cases; it will allow for aggrieved plaintiffs to recover fully; and it will permit courts to vindicate
rights the courts have yet to articulate clearly, which, in turn, will further the development of
constitutional law.
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system of constitutional law.249 The greatest benefit will come with
respect to those rights designed to protect individuals from certain
government conduct in the investigation of crimes and in the
enforcement of the criminal law.
Without the recognition of state constitutional torts, state
criminal constitutional law will only develop in criminal cases. In
such situations, courts may be unwilling to extend the reach of the
state constitution because the immediate effect will often be the exclu-
sion of evidence and the loss of a conviction. In addition, because the
law is being developed in a criminal case, police and prosecutors have
no advance warning that their conduct will offend the constitutional
rights of the accused and thus cannot conform their conduct. It is
quite understandable, albeit not necessarily morally defensible, that a
court might refuse to extend the reach of a constitution in such cases.
When a civil action is brought by a plaintiff who is not facing
any criminal charges, however, the balance shifts in favor of exten-
sion. Judges have no fear that a criminal will go unpunished and be
released back into. society.2 50 They need not worry that the police did
not and could not expect that their conduct would violate a constitu-
tion. Instead, a plaintiff free of any criminal wrongdoing will be seek-
ing recovery for the offensive behavior of the government against
which a constitution is specifically designed to protect. Thus, the
recognition of constitutional tort actions will create a new and more ef-
fective avenue for the development of criminal constitutional law.251
As it is often the goal of a plaintiff to convince a court to recognize a
right for the first time,252 the courts are able to develop constitutional
law and satisfy the plaintiff simultaneously.
249. See Whitman, 72 Chi. Kent L. Rev. at 676-77 (cited in note 133) (noting that constitu-
tional torts allow for the development of constitutional law because they are "a mechanism for
setting minimum standards for official behavior when democratic and administrative safeguards
fail").
250. This is not to say, however, that future similar conduct of the police in criminal cases
should be accepted. Obviously if it offends the constitution in a civil case, it offends the constitu-
tion in a criminal case. Government officials, though, will have fair warning that these actions
are unconstitutional and that they must conform their actions to these constitutional standards.
Nor does it follow from this argument that courts should not interpret the constitution anew in
criminal cases. However, this argument recognizes as a practical matter that judges are less
likely to read the constitutional protections broadly in criminal cases of first impression.
251. See also Wells, 72 Chi. Kent. L. Rev. at 636 (cited in note 212) (recognizing that the use
of constitutional torts gives rise "to a new conception of rights"); Whitman, 72 Chi. Kent L. Rev.
at 669 (cited in note 133) (arguing that constitutional torts have "expanded the reach" of
constitutional law "by making it easier to argue that constitutional rights have been violated").
252. Whitman, 79 Mich. L. Rev. at 52 (cited in note 16).
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C. Helping Fulfill the Promise of Checks and Balances
The doctrine of checks and balances is designed to limit the
amount of power amassed by any one branch of a government.253 To
this end, it is the role of the judiciary, through judicial review, to
"check" the actions of the political branches to ensure that they
conform with a state's constitution. 25 Thus, under the American
constitutional scheme, the courts cannot condone any attempt by the
political branches to remove liability by either creating immunity or
failing to enact a statutory cause of action condoned by the courts. A
passive judiciary under such circumstances would permit exactly what
the framers feared: a concentration of power which would destroy
individual rights.25 5 Although the broader doctrine of separation of
powers is often invoked by state courts rejecting a direct cause of
action under state constitutions, 56 the doctrine of checks and balances
provides a powerful argument for the adoption of such a claim because
constitutional torts guarantee a check on the unconstitutional acts of
the political branches.
D. Enforcing the Intent of the Framers
Some scholars argue that the framers of the U.S. Constitution
intended damages to be the remedy for a violation of the Constitution.
This argument stems from the notion that the founding fathers were
aware of the common law remedies, and they fully expected that they
would be applied to enforce the Bill of Rights and thus included no
remedial provision.257 Further, it is unlikely that they intended the
political branches to pass implementing legislation because the
founders enacted the Bill of Rights specifically to limit those same
branches.258 This concept is just as pertinent, if not more, to state
constitutional torts because states are the depositories of the common
253. Bandes, 68 S. Cal. L. Rev. at 317 (cited in note 15).
254. Id.
255. Id. at 319.
256. See Part H.B.5 (discussing how courts refuse to recognize these actions because of
judicial incompetence or impropriety).
257. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., and Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and
Constitutional Remedies, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1731, 1779 (1991); Nichol, 75 Va. L. Rev. at 1136
(cited in note 92) ("tT]he framers must have intended to vindicate constitutional rights through
the institutions of the common law; .... what other choice did they have?").
258. Bandes, 68 S. Cal. L. Rev. at 313 (cited in note 15); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights
and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 Yale L. J. 1193, 1202 (1992).
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law.259 Thus, constitutional torts are necessary to effectuate the
framers' intent with respect to legal remedies. 260
E. A State Remedy for a State Wrong: The Ability to Adjudicate
Claims in State Court
The recognition of constitutional torts for violations of state
constitutions will not only compensate individuals for the loss of their
rights and vindicate those rights through the law, but will also allow
state courts to- have complete jurisdiction and control over these
claims. Just as the federal courts are often thought of as the appro-
priate place to adjudicate violations of federal rights, 2 1 state courts
should adjudicate claims arising under state constitutions and against
state actors.
A separate remedy in state court is essential to state
sovereignty.262 First, judges will be able to promote the policies of
their state. Further, plaintiffs may stand a better chance of recovery
259. See, for example, State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236, 486 P.2d 247, 249 (Idaho 1971)
(discussing the common law powers of Idaho courts and the adoption of English common law in
Idaho); Meech v. Hillhaven West, Inc., 238 Mont. 21, 776 P.2d 488, 494 (1989) (discussing the role
of the common law in Montana state courts).
260. Many courts have already relied on the intent of the framers to infer liability for a
constitutional provision. Jones, 724 F. Supp. at 35; Walinski, 377 N.E.2d at 242. Other courts
have relied on the voters approving amendments, Durant, 1997 WL 430992 at 11 ("The intent of
the people in enacting art. 9, § 32 of the Michigan Constitution was not to enact a constitutional
provision that could not be effectively enforced."); Bonner, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 675 (relying on
voter intent to determine that a constitutional provision is self-executing and thus supporting a
cause of action for damages); Schreiner, 408 So.2d at 714 (same).
Relying on intent does not come without problems, however. First, discovering the appropri-
ate legislative history may be quite difficult if not completely impossible with regard to some
state constitutions. Even if the legislative history can be found, it is very likely that the framers
did not even address remedies for constitutional wrongs in their debates or committee hearings.
Second, attempting to base the cause of action on the intent of voters is intrinsically mis-
placed. Jane S. Schacter, The Pursuit of 'Topular Intent" Interpretive Dilemmas in Direct
Democracy, 105 Yale L. J. 107 (1995). Legislative intent is usually found in the records of
legislative proceedings, including debates and committee reports. The public at large does not
engage in any of the formalized fact-finding, discussions, or report writing that a legislative body
is prone to do. Thus, there is no true "legislative history" with respect to voter approved consti-
tutions and constitutional amendments.
Third, even though it may have been the intent that damage awards remedy constitutional
violations, the actual text of the document does not usually expound upon this. Thus, courts
must still rely on some other document or other source of law to craft the appropriate remedy.
261. Whitman, 79 Mich. L. Rev. at 23 (cited in note 16).
262. In addition, many violations of state constitutions often implicate parallel provisions of
the federal constitution. Plaintiffs may now have a choice of forums. By relying solely on the
state constitution, plaintiffs may avoid federal court and the limitations, such as qualified
immunity and personal liability, of § 1983.
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in state courts as state judges and juries may be more condemning of
state agents who violate state constitutional law.63 The interests that




V. THE POWER TO IMPLY OR CREATE DAMAGE ACTIONS: THE COMMON
LAW AND STATE COMMON LAW COURTS
As Alexander Hamilton wrote, "there ought always to be a
constitutional method of giving efficacy to constitutional provisions. ''265
In meeting this goal, state courts have several theories upon which
they can justify the creation of constitutional torts. These include (1)
the common law powers of common law courts, (2) the doctrine of
implied causes of action as it existed at common law, (3) the
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 874A, and (4) the remedy clauses of
state constitutions. Regardless of the rationale selected, state courts
must recognize that the state constitution demands the remedy.
263. Although it has often been argued that the federal bench is of a higher quality, Burt
Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1105, 1106-15 (1977), and that state judges may
be more sympathetic to defendants where federal civil rights claims are filed, Whitman, 79 Mich.
L. Rev. at 23 (cited in note 16) (citing Paul Chevigny, Section 1983 Jurisdiction: A Reply, 83
Harv. L. Rev. 1352, 1358 (1970)), it stands to reason that where state law is implicated these
factors cease to be relevant. It is in the state judge's interest to develop state law and to hold the
state government responsible for its violations in order to create a true identity for the state. As
state law develops and the state is held accountable for its actions, the state courts and the
states themselves may gain greater influence in the union and may be more trusted by the
community.
264. Justice Urbigkit of the Wyoming Supreme Court recognized the importance of state
remedies:
The thesis presented that citizen's rights within the state constitution are not without
substance, even if not enforced by federal legislation, has realistic precedent by previous
use of the Bivens remedy for the state court to enforce the rights independent of the fed-
eral civil rights action and proceeding. These concepts, although not yet to have pre-
dominated because of the preferential posture of past federal remedies, can now be culti-
vated to further the well-being of our citizens in a realistic recognition of the state's
function in the federal system for the mutual protection of the state's constitutional
guarantees.
Cooney, 792 P.2d at 1321 (Urbigkit, J., dissenting). See also Whitman, 79 Mich. L. Rev. at 22
(cited in note 16) ("[The distinctively federal nature of the interest asserted by the plaintiff calls
for a separate, and fully, protective, federal remedy") (footnote omitted).
265. The Federalist No. 80 (Hamilton) in Rossiter, ed., The Federalist Papers at 475 (cited in
note 135).
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A. The Traditional Role of the Courts in Protecting Individual
Liberties and Rights at Common Law
State courts are the depositories of the common law. As com-
mon law courts, they can fashion remedies to vindicate personal
rights.2s State constitutional guarantees are the product of the com-
mon law and reflect those rights and interests created through judicial
development.27 In fact, most constitutional guarantees have common
law antecedents,268 violations of which could be remedied through
common law actions for damages.269 Thus, state common law courts
are no more overstepping their duties and powers when they remedy a
constitutional violation with damages, 270 than they are when they
recognize any other tort for the first time.271  Indeed, state
constitutions are the product of the common law process 272 and should
be subject to the remedies available at common law.273 Just as the
common law guarantees a remedy for every wrong,274 so must state
constitutions.
266. Sundheim, 926 P.2d at 549.
267. Nichol, 75 Va. L. Rev. at 1136 (cited in note 92). See also Wells, 72 Chi. Kent. L. Rev.
at 618 (cited in note 212) (noting that constitutional torts should protect "all the interests pro-
tected by the common law").
268. Kaye, 23 Rutgers L. J. at 729-38 (cited in note 236). This is evident in the history of
the United States Bill of Rights, as Professor Leonard Levy has duly noted: "In the national Bill
of Rights, for example, the guarantees of the right against self-incrimination, indictment by
grand jury, and trial by jury in civil and criminal cases simply declared the common law, as
indeed was the case concerning numerous provisions of the Bill of Rights." Id. at 732 (citing
Leonard W. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press 324-25 (Oxford U., 1985)).
269. See notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
270. This concept is as old as the Magna Carta. See id. But see Wells, 72 Chi. Kent L. Rev.
at 619 (cited in note 212) (noting the ambivalence unelected judges feel in creating constitutional
torts).
271. See Keeton, et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 1 at 3-4 (cited in note 155) ("New and
nameless torts are being recognized constantly, and the progress of the common law is marked
by many cases of first impression, in which the court has struck out boldly to create a new cause
of action, where none had been recognized before."); Kaye, 23 Rutgers L. J. at 743-44 (cited in
note 236) (discussing the rise of the right to privacy and torts to protect that right).
272. See Nichol, 75 Va. L. Rev. at 1136 (cited in note 92); Al Katz, The Jurisprudence of
Remedies: Constitutional Legality and the Law of Torts in Bell v. Hood, 117 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 9-
11 (1968).
273. The New York Court of Appeals has observed:
[C]ourts have looked to the common law antecedents of the constitutional provision to
discover whether a damage remedy may be implied. New York's first Constitution in
1777 recognized and adopted the existing common law of England and each succeeding
Constitution has continued that practice. Thus, in some cases, there exist grounds for
implying a damage remedy based upon pre-existing common law duties and rights.
Brown, 674 N.E.2d at 1138.
274. Shields, 658 A.2d at 928 ("The common law, which provides a remedy for every wrong,
provides a remedy for violation of a constitutional right."); Corum, 413 S.E.2d at 290.
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If constitutional guarantees of individual rights are to have any
meaning, courts must provide a remedy. Courts in common law
England often allowed for the recovery of damage awards for
violations of the English Constitution.275 State courts have followed
this tradition and have used their common law authority to imply
causes of action for statutory violations276 and to recognize the
common law doctrine of sovereign immunity.277 If a statutory right or
interest is deserving of protection, certainly constitutional provisions,
as the collective limitation on government issued by the people, are
deserving of damage remedies.2 78 American common law courts should
be no less hesitant to follow their common law roots with respect to
constitutional provisions.279
B. The Common Law and Implied Causes of Action
The common law grants courts the power to imply a cause of
action for damages for a violation of a legislative provision.280  This
doctrine is a viable theory upon which state courts may base liability
for constitutional violations. Presumably, the drafters of state consti-
tutions were aware of this doctrine. 281 In addition, many state consti-
275. See notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
276. See Part II.B.1.
277. See Corum, 413 S.E.2d at 291-92 (discussing the judicially created common law
doctrine of sovereign immunity in North Carolina).
278. The Supreme Court of Connecticut, however, has recently held that although it is
proper to create damage awards for the violation of a statute, it is improper to compensate for
violations of the state constitution in the same respect:
[We decline to read these cases as establishing a common law precedent for the existence
of a constitutional claim for damages for any and all alleged misconduct by state or local
governmental officers. It is more plausible to understand these cases as precursors of the
modern principle that violation of statutory rights may allow an injured person to assert
a private cause of action or a traditional tort action for damages.
Kelley Property, 627 A.2d at 919.
279. Walter E. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 Harv. L.
Rev. 1532, 1542 (1972) ("Given a common law background in which courts created damage
remedies as a matter of course, it is not unreasonable to presume ... judicial power to create a
damage remedy."); Love, 49 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. at 80-81 (cited in note 162) (discussing the
Supreme Court's reliance on the decision in Ashby v. White in recognizing a political right and
the use of damages to rectify violations of those rights). See Kelley Property, 627 A.2d at 929
(Borden, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (relying on common law causes of action
for violations of constitutional rights to infer a cause of action under the Connecticut
Constitution).
280. See K.M. Stanton, Breach of Statutory Duty in Tort 2 (Sweet & Maxwell, 1986);
Campbell, 15 Monash L. Rev. at 390 (cited in note 20); Ashby, 92 Eng. Rep. at 136 (Holt, C.J.,
dissenting). This authority has existed since the passage of the Statute of Westminster II in
1295. Stanton, Breach of Statutory Duty in Tort 2 (cited in note 280).
281. See Bott, 922 P.2d at 739 (concluding that the framers of the Utah Constitution were
most likely aware of the English common law decisions granting damage awards for violations of
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tutions28s2 and statutory codes2 3 contain provisions by which the com-
mon law of England is specifically adopted as state law. As courts
already apply this theory to cases of breach of state statutory duties,2
they can easily apply it to breaches of state constitutional provisions.
C. The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 874A
Those state courts which desire another justification for the
award of damages for a violation of a constitutional right may choose
to follow Section 874A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.25  The
provision argues for the judicial creation of a cause of action for a
violation of a '"egislative provision!' even when the legislature has not
addressed civil liability.e Comment (a) specifically contemplates the
application of the section to constitutional provisions.2
7
The Restatement requires that the remedy be "in furtherance
of the legislation," necessary "to assure the effectiveness of the provi-
sion," and designed to protect the plaintiff.2s Constitutional provi-
sions can easily satisfy these three requirements. First, as the
common law cases demonstrate, courts have traditionally construed
torts as furthering constitutional rights.2 9 Second, the remedy is
necessary to vindicate the right because without the remedy, the
English constitutional rights and most likely contemplated such a remedy for the Utah
Constitution).
282. See, for example, Md. Const., Decl. of Rights, Art. 5.
283. See, for example, Ala. Code § 1-3-1 (1987); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 1-2-119; Cal. Civil Code
§ 22.2.
284. Nearing, 670 P.2d at 141. See Kelley Property, 627 A.2d at 919 (discussing implied
causes of action).
285. The provision provides:
When a legislative provision protects a class of persons by proscribing or requiring cer-
tain conduct but does not provide a civil remedy for the violation, the court may, if it de-
termines that the remedy is appropriate in furtherance of the purpose of the legislation
and needed to assure the effectiveness of the provision, accord to an injured member of
the class a right of action, using a suitable existing tort action or a new cause of action
analogous to an existing tort action.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 874A (1979).
286. Id.
287. Id. § 874A, cmt. a.
288. Id. § 874A. In the realm of statutes, the intent of the legislature is often a determining
factor. Shields, 658 A-2d at 933. However, the requirement is immaterial for constitutional
provisions. Because constitutions are enacted by all of the community, "the court normally need
not grapple with difficult questions of legislative intent in regard to such a remedy." Friesen, 63
Tex. L. Rev. at 1283 (cited in note 215).
289. See Part H.A.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:1525
constitutional provision would amount to no more than a guideline. 290
Finally, constitutional provisions are created to limit the government
for the benefit of the entire community. Accordingly, if the plaintiff
has a right under a constitution, he is a member of the class it was de-
signed to protect. Section 874A provides a viable alternative for state
courts that may be unwilling to rely completely on English common
law precedents.291
D. Remedy Clauses and Common Law Causes of Action
Many state constitutions contain "open court" or remedy
clauses. 92 Although courts have routinely interpreted these clauses as
creating no new remedies, these clauses do guarantee a remedy for
every wrong involving an interest or right that some other source of
law protects. 293 Thus, applying the clause in conjunction with the
common law recognition of constitutional torts creates a strong
argument that state constitutions dictate recognition of constitutional
claims for damages.
Although the Supreme Court of Colorado has rejected the
concept that its remedy clause requires the recognition of constitu-
tional torts,2 94 the court did not address the argument that a remedy
existed at common law for such violations and is thus required under
the state constitution. The Vermont Supreme Court, however, has
implicitly accepted this argument.295 Basing the claim upon the
290. Nichol, 75 Va. L. Rev. at 1137 (cited in note 92) ("If limitations on government power
are to be made meaningful, some evolving remedial process is essential.").
291. The provision has been cited by many courts addressing the issue of constitutional
torts. See, for example, Brown, 674 N.E.2d at 1138; Shields, 658 A.2d at 932; Kelley Property,
627 A.2d at 920 n.26.
292. The remedy clause of the Colorado Constitution, which is similar to most state consti-
tutions, provides: "Courts of justice shall be open to every person, and a speedy remedy afforded
for every injury to person, property or character; and right and justice should be administered
without sale, denial or delay." Colo. Const, Art. H, § 6. Such clauses originated in chapter 40 of
the Magna Carta: "To no one will we sell, to no one will we deny, or delay, right or justice."
Magna Carta ch. 40 (1215).
293. Shields, 658 A.2d at 928 ("Though [the remedy clause] does not create substantive
rights, it does ensure access to the judicial process."); Friesen, 63 Tex. L. Rev. at 1297 (cited in
note 215); Hans A. Linde, Without 'Due Process" Unconstitutional Law in Oregon, 49 Or. L. Rev.
125, 136-38 (1970).
294. Sundheim, 926 P.2d at 439 (concluding that the remedy clause of the state constitution
in conjunction with the state due process clause did not require the recognition of a state
constitutional tort claim).
295. In Shields v. Gerhart, the Supreme Court of Vermont wrote:
The Vermont Constitution mandates that "[e]very person within this state ought to find a
certain remedy, by having recourse to the laws, for all injuries or wrongs which he may
receive in his person, property, or character.... " Vt. Const., ch. I, art. 4. Though Article
4 does not create substantive rights, it does ensure access to the judicial process.... The
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remedy clause implicitly recognizes that the cause of action is one of
constitutional dimensions.
VI. CONCLUSION: THE SELF-DEFEATING CAUSE OF ACTION
State constitutional torts have received little if any attention
from courts or scholars in the American legal community. In the last
few years, however, aggrieved citizens have discovered this cause of
action as a means to vindicate their state constitutional rights. In
turn, state courts have been forced to address the propriety of consti-
tutional torts and the extent of government liability.
Constitutional torts serve important functions. They affirm an
aggrieved citizen's rights, compensate the citizen for the violation of
his rights, deter future violations, vindicate rights enumerated in
constitutions, and provide a means of corrective justice. Recognizing
constitutional torts also promotes goals unique to constitutional
violations and the position of the government in society. Direct causes
of action protect state constitutional rights and allow for the
development of criminal constitutional law in non-criminal cases.
They promote moral behavior by the government as well as by private
citizens. The causes of action protect the reasonable reliance of the
citizenry, fulfill the promise of checks and balances, and help realize
the intent of the framers; Institutional liability of the government is
necessary to achieve these goals, for it is the government which places
individuals in the position to violate the constitution.
The necessity of constitutional torts is apparent, and the re-
fusal to recognize them is inexcusable. The actions are a means to an
end, a means which will be unnecessary once the end is accomplished.
The legal system must ensure that state governments do not violate
their respective constitutions and that plaintiffs are properly com-
pensated for the violation of rights that are so important that the
people chose to enumerate them in a constitution. So long as the
government violates the dictates of the people expressed in state
constitutions, constitutional torts must exist and must be enthusias-
common law, which provides a remedy for every wrong, provides a remedy for violation of
a constitutional right.... To deprive individuals of a means by which to vindicate their
constitutional rights would negate the will of the people in ratifying the constitution, and
neither this Court nor the Legislature has the power to do so.
Shields, 658 A.2d at 928 (citations omitted). The court, however, did not allow a cause of action
for damages because another remedy was available. Id. at 934.
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tically prosecuted. Direct causes of action should not need to exist;
unfortunately, they must. With the adoption and effective prosecution
of direct causes of action, though, perhaps they will become relics of an
unfamiliar time when constitutional violations were rampant.
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